Essays in applied microeconomics by Steinhauer, Andreas
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2014
Essays in applied microeconomics
Steinhauer, Andreas
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-108741
Dissertation
Published Version
Originally published at:
Steinhauer, Andreas. Essays in applied microeconomics. 2014, University of Zurich, Faculty of Eco-
nomics.
Essays in Applied Microeconomics
Dissertation
for the Faculty of Economics, Business
Administration and Information Technology of the
University of Zurich
to achieve the title of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
presented by
Beatrice Brunner
from Wald ZH
approved in July 2013 at the request of
Prof. Dr. Josef Zweimu¨ller
Prof. Dr. Rainer Winkelmann
The Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology of
the University of Zurich hereby authorizes the printing of this Doctoral Thesis, with-
out thereby giving any opinion on the views contained therein.
Zurich, July 17, 2013
Chairman of the Doctoral Committee: Prof. Dr. Dieter Pfaff
Contents
Preface vii
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Chapter 2: The Impact of Labor Market Entry
Conditions on Initial Job Assignment and
Wages 7
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Data and Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.1 Data Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.2 Key Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.3 Sample Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.4 Sample Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 The Persistence of Initial Labor Market Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.1 Graphical Evidence on the Evolution of Wages and Initial Con-
ditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.2 Econometric Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.3 Main Results: Initial Labor Market Conditions and Wages . . . 19
2.3.4 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.5 Endogenous Labor Market Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.6 Quantitative Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4 Initial Job Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
iii
Contents Contents
2.4.1 Quality of Workers’ First Employer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.2 The Importance of the Initial Employer for the Evolution of Wages 33
2.5 Job Mobility and Quality of Subsequent Employers . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.A Appendix: Sample Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Chapter 3: Announcement Effects of Health Policy
Reforms: Evidence from the Abolition of
Austria’s Baby Bonus 43
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 The Austrian Baby Bonus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.1 Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.2 The Abolition of the Baby Bonus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.3 The Window of Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 Data and Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.1 Data Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.2 Sample Period(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.3 The Monthly Birth Count, 1990–2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4 Fertility Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4.1 Estimating the Fertility Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4.2 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.3 Conception (Re-)Scheduling vs. Timing of Births . . . . . . . . 56
3.5 Taking Risks for the Bonus? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5.1 Birth Complications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5.2 Newborns’ Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.A Appendix: Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Chapter 4: Cultural Distance and Attitudes Towards
Immigration: Evidence from Swiss Voting
Results 65
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 Cultural Values and Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3 Data and Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3.1 National Votes on Immigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3.2 Swiss Population Census . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
iv
Contents
4.3.3 Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.4 Empirical Model and Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4.1 Econometric Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4.2 Validity of the Identifying Assumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.5.1 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.5.2 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.5.3 The Role of the Voter Turnout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.5.4 The Rise of Switzerland’s Right-Wing Party . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Bibliography 101
Curriculum Vitae 109
v
Contents
vi
Preface
“I may not have gone where I intended to go, but I think I have ended up
where I needed to be.”
Douglas Adams (1952–2001), English writer, humorist and dramatist
Writing my doctoral thesis has been a challenging but also a very enjoyable experi-
ence. I would like to thank everyone involved for the intellectual, moral, and financial
support. In retrospect, I was lucky to have made the right choices and have met in-
spiring people who motivated me to change the course of my career as an economist.
Rafael Lalive’s course on causal analysis aroused my interest in modern econometric
methods and convinced me to write my term paper at the Chair of Macroeconomics
and Labor Markets. It is at this chair where I got introduced to the fascinating world
of labor economics, and, most importantly, where my passion for programming and
my particular interest in econometric methods could thrive in combination.
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Josef Zweimu¨ller for giving
me the unique opportunity to write this dissertation at his chair and for his continued
support and encouragement. Josef created (and still creates) a highly inspiring and
pleasant working atmosphere while allowing greatest possible scientific freedom. He
taught me how to frame a promising research project and always helped me to exploit
every project’s full potential. I am similarly indebted to Andreas Kuhn for his great
guidance and unfailing support. His unlimited zeal and his infectious enthusiasm
for research have been driving forces throughout this project. He taught me how
to conduct sound and convincing empirical research, and he thereby strongly shaped
my own way of thinking about empirical research questions. Many thanks go to
Andreas also for providing me with material and links that I could not possibly have
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This dissertation consists of three self contained essays in applied microeconomics.
While disparate in their subject, they share the common theme of rigorous econo-
metric identification with the aim of exploring interesting scientific questions and to
test policy relevant hypotheses in various research areas. Chapter 2 belongs to the
field of labor economics and studies the short and long run impact of labor market
entry conditions on job assignment and wages. Chapter 3 adds to the field of health
economics. It is concerned with the identification of short-term fertility and health
effects following the early announcement of a health policy reform. Chapter 4 con-
tributes to the field of political economy and offers new insights about how attitudes
towards immigration are causally affected by the size and cultural composition of the
local immigrant population.
The crucial ingredient required in order to provide convincing answers to these re-
search questions is a sound empirical strategy. Therefore, based on the nature of data,
each essay adopts a specific econometric technique that is considered to be best suited
to explore the effect of interest. Chapter 2 uses both ordinary least squares (OLS)
and instrumental variable (IV) methods, and provides evidence that implies that OLS
estimates represent a lower bound of the true effect while IV estimates represent an
upper bound. The estimation in chapter 3 relies on predetermined longitudinal reg-
ularities in the outcome variable. In particular, we make an out-of-sample prediction
of the outcome in the absence of the announcement of the policy change and compare
it with the actually observed outcome. The difference represents our estimate of the
impact of the health policy reform. Chapter 4 also uses instrumental variable tech-
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niques. The remainder of this introductory chapter provides a short summary of each
of the three essays.
The Impact of Labor Market Entry Conditions on Initial Job Assign-
ment and Wages
The recent economic crisis has renewed academic interest in the potential impact of
business cycle fluctuations on labor markets. However, while there exists extensive
evidence on the short-run association between local labor market conditions and real
wages, only few evidence exists on the longer-run effects of business cycle fluctuations.
Clearly, even small initial wage shortfalls may, in the longer run, accrue to substan-
tial overall losses in lifetime earnings if initial wage losses resulting from poor entry
conditions persist.
In the first chapter, we estimate the short and long-run impact of initial labor
market conditions on wages for young males entering the Austrian labor market be-
tween 1978 and 2000. Additionally, we analyze changes in the quality of workers’ first
employer over the business cycle and the importance of first employers for individ-
uals’ entry and subsequent wages. We do so using Austrian social security records
that contain detailed individual earnings and employment histories for the universe
of private-sector employees form 1972 to 2005. We restrict our sample to low and
medium-skilled workers, more precisely, we focus on individuals with no more than
secondary education (i.e. vocational training). Our measure for external initial labor
market conditions is the annual male unemployment rate at the state-level.
As relates to our estimation strategy, we apply both OLS and instrumental variable
methods. While focussing on OLS, we also take into account that the composition
of labor market entrants may be endogenous with respect to variations in the local
business cycle, and instrument the unemployment rate at labor market entry with
the unemployment rate at age 16, the age at which mandatory schooling ends. Our
results suggest that IV estimates provide an upper bound of the wage effects, whereas
direct evidence on positive sample selection in economic downturns implies that OLS
estimates represent a lower bound of the wage effects of local entry conditions.
Consistent with previous evidence, we find a substantial wage penalty from poor
entry conditions on starting wages. Our preferred estimates imply that an increase in
the initial unemployment rate by one percentage point is associated with 0.9% lower
starting wages. Moreover, this initial wage loss from entering the labor market during
high unemployment turns out to be highly persistent, resulting in sizeable negative
effects on lifetime earnings. An increase in the initial unemployment rate by one
percentage point is estimated to result in a lifetime loss in wages of about 1.3%. We
2
Introduction
further show that there is considerable cyclical variation in the quality of a worker’s
first regular employment. Even though workers are positively selected in times of high
unemployment, they end up working in firms that are younger and smaller, and that
generally pay lower wages. Moreover, we show that the characteristics of workers’
first employers explain as much as three-quarters of the observed long-run effects
resulting from poor entry conditions. Finally, we find some very distinct patterns for
blue and white-collar workers. While the negative wage effects fade away for white-
collar workers after about five to ten years, the wage effects for blue-collar workers
are much more persistent because some of them appear to be permanently locked in
into low-paying jobs.
Announcement Effects of Health Policy Reforms: Evidence from the
Abolition of Austria’s Baby Bonus
This chapter is motivated by the fact that anticipatory behavior of individuals has po-
tentially important implications for the implementation, as well as for the evaluation,
of health policy reforms. More specifically, we may be especially concerned about
potential negative health effects if individuals respond to anticipated or announced
changes in financial incentives but are unable to foresee all possible health effects
resulting from behavioral changes.
In chapter 3, we study the fertility effects, as well as the potential health con-
sequences for both mother and newborn child, following the announcement of the
abolition of the Austrian baby bonus as of January 1, 1997. The Austrian baby bonus
amounted to a maximum of 1090 e per child and was paid conditional on medical
examinations of both mother and child. The unique feature of this policy change is
that the elimination of the benefit was announced about ten months prior to enact-
ment. Thus, although the response window was only limited to three weeks, the early
announcement created the potential for an announcement effect since prospective par-
ents had both an incentive and the opportunity to react and move their baby plans
forward.
Because there is no control group available, our estimation strategy relies on reg-
ularities in the data before the announcement. More precisely, we make an out-
of-sample prediction of the outcome in the absence of the early announcement, the
difference between the observed and the predicted number (i.e. the residual) then
represents our estimate of the announcement impact.
We find robust evidence that, within the month before the abolition (December
1996), about 8% more babies were born than in the absence of the announcement of the
policy change. Considering the fact that the window of opportunity was quite a short
3
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period of three weeks only, this is a sizeable effect. Moreover, we find (re-)scheduling
of conceptions rather than birth timing (through medical intervention methods like
cesarean sections) to be the source of the fertility effect. The analysis of birth pro-
cedures further reveals a significant increase in the fraction of mothers experiencing
some kind of birth complications by about one percentage point. We calculate that
only a small fraction of this increase can be attributed to changes in observable ma-
ternal characteristics. We argue that some part of the unexplained increase in birth
complications is potentially caused by an underlying increase in behavioral and/or
psychological risks triggered by (re-)scheduled pregnancies. However, the increase in
birth complications notwithstanding, we do not find any adverse immediate impact
on newborns’ health.
On a more general level, the results of chapter 3 illustrate that announcement
effects may be an important issue in health policy reforms. The abolition of the
Austrian baby bonus clearly shows that even relatively small changes in financial
incentives may trigger substantial behavioral responses. Policy makers should thus be
aware that not only a policy (reform) itself, but also the public announcement of its
abolition (or introduction) may have an impact on individual behavior.
Cultural Distance and Attitudes Towards Immigration: Evidence from
Swiss Voting Results
Chapter 4 is motivated by the fact that global international migration is increasing not
only in scale but also in the cultural diversity of groups involved in that movement.
As a consequence, the host countries have to cope with increased levels of social and
cultural diversity and thus face new challenges that may not only lead to additional
costs but also cause social tensions or even stir up anti-immigration sentiments.
In the final chapter of my dissertation, I shed light on the impact of immigration
on anti-immigration attitudes from a novel prospective. First, instead of using survey
data, I take advantage of Switzerland’s system of direct democracy, where citizens
vote regularly on immigration issues. I transform these voting results into a share
of anti-immigration votes and use them as a direct measure of attitudes towards im-
migration. Second, I focus on understanding how the cultural distance between the
immigrant population and the Swiss affects this relationship. Drawing on findings
from the World Value Surveys, I categorize Swiss immigrants into different groups
according to cultural values and beliefs of their source country. In particular I dif-
ferentiate between nationalities with a value system similar to the Swiss (culturally
similar immigrants) and nationalities without one (culturally different immigrants).
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In summary, I investigate whether and to what extent natives’ attitudes towards im-
migration are causally affected by the culture-specific immigrant shares of the locality
in which they live.
In order to explore this question, I combine census data with outcomes of national
votes about immigration in Switzerland between 1970 and 2010. To take endogeneity
of the place of residence of both natives and immigrants into account, I instrument
the immigrant share in the municipality with the immigrant share in the local labor
market. Identification therefore relies on the assumption that an individual’s mobility
is geographically limited by exogenous factors like family and friends. Indeed, the
analysis of residential mobility effects in response to immigration provides evidence
that strongly supports the validity of the identifying assumption.
The main finding of this chapter is that it is not the overall immigrant share per se,
but merely the presence of culturally different immigrants that induces Swiss citizens
to vote for a more restrictive immigration policy. In fact, the local share of culturally
different immigrants turns out to be a significant and sizeable determinant of the pro-
portion of anti-immigration votes. Baseline estimates suggest that a one percentage
point increase in the share of culturally different immigrants results in a 1.12 percent-
age point increase in the share of anti-immigration votes. By contrast, the share of
culturally similar immigrants does not seem to affect natives voting behavior at all.
This result holds for each single vote, is not sensitive to a finer cultural classification
of immigrants, and does not seem to be driven b selectivity of turnout. Results further
suggest a tight link between voting in favor of a more restrictive immigration policy
and support for the right-wing Swiss people’s party.
These findings may have implications for the continuing debates over immigration
policy and help inform policy makers about possible impacts of the changing immi-
grant composition on outcomes of future votes. Moreover, the finding that the ethnic
composition of the locality in which individuals live affects anti-immigration attitudes
may also have implications for continuing debates about the nature and location of
new refugee accommodation centers.
5
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CHAPTER 2
The Impact of Labor Market Entry Conditions on Initial
Job Assignment and Wages
Joint with Andreas Kuhn
A revised version of this chapter is accepted for publication in the Journal of Popula-
tion Economics. Earlier versions have been published in 2009 as IEW Working Paper,
No. 457; IZA Discussion Paper, No. 4601; NRN Working Paper, No. 929 and in 2010
as IEW Working Paper, No. 520; IZA Discussion Paper, No. 5360; NRN Working
Paper, No. 1015.
2.1 Introduction
The recent economic crisis has renewed academic interest in the potential impact of
business cycle fluctuations on labor markets (e.g. Elsby et al., 2010). However, while
labor economists have studied the short-run association between local labor market
conditions and real wages extensively for quite some time (e.g. Blanchflower and Os-
wald, 1990), longer-run effects of business cycle fluctuations on individuals’ wages have
only more recently caught the attention of empirical research.1 Clearly, even small
initial wage shortfalls may, in the longer run, eventually accrue to substantial overall
1Most studies estimating the short-run association between fluctuations in local unemployment
rates and wages find that wages vary negatively with local unemployment. This negative association
is a very robust empirical pattern; it has been shown to exist for a wide range of different countries,
using very different sources of data and diverse empirical specifications. See Nijkamp and Poot (2005)
for a comprehensive survey of this literature.
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losses in lifetime earnings if initial wage losses resulting from poor entry conditions
persist.2
Indeed, recent empirical evidence suggests that substantial losses in lifetime earn-
ings result from entering the labor market during an economic downturn, as opposed
to entering during an expansion. Oreopoulos et al. (2012) explore the effects of en-
tering the labor market during a recession on individuals’ earnings, using data on
Canadian college graduates who entered the labor market between 1982 and 1999.
They find a substantial initial wage penalty of about 9% that only fades to zero after
the first decade of a worker’s career. A similar result is reported in Kahn (2010), who
focuses on male college graduates in the United States graduating sometime between
1979 and 1988. She finds that the group graduating in the worst economic situation
incurs a wage loss of up to 13% each year, relative to those graduating in the best
initial conditions, and that this initial wage loss persists over the first 20 years of a
workers’ labor market career. Similar results are reported in Oyer (2006), who shows
that PhD students in economics are considerably more likely to find a position at
one of the top universities in the United States if they graduate in times when the
demand for economists is high. In a related study, he finds that those MBA students
who complete their training during a recession suffer from negative effects on wages
(Oyer, 2008). In both studies, the long-term effects on income appear to stem from
the fact that diverse employers hire workers entering the labor market under different
conditions, therefore giving them access to distinct jobs. The entry job is thus signif-
icant for the future career, and this appears to be of particular importance for highly
educated individuals for whom the transition in and out of attractive positions is very
low.3 Mansour (2009) also focuses on college graduates in the US and again finds
negative and persistent wage effects from entry into the labor force during a recession.
Moreover, he shows that failure to account for endogenous sample composition under-
estimates both the immediate wage effects as well as the persistence of wage effects
2Previous research has shown that the early years in a worker’s labor market career are of special
importance (Gardecki and Neumark, 1998; Neumark, 2002). In terms of wages, Murphy and Welch
(1990) estimate that almost 80% of all (i.e. lifetime) wage increases accrue within the first ten years
of labor market experience. Moreover, movements across jobs are considerably more likely at the
beginning of a worker’s career than later on (Topel and Ward, 1992).
3One important concern regarding the validity of these results is that schooling and first entry
into the labor force may be endogenous both because individuals may choose to stay in school or
continue further training when faced with high unemployment and low starting wages. Indeed, several
studies find that enrollment rates are high when unemployment is high and the opportunity costs of
schooling are low (e.g. Clark, 2011). In line with these findings, both Kahn (2010) and Oreopoulos
et al. (2012) find the duration of schooling to be endogenous. Both tackle the endogeneity problem
by instrumenting the unemployment rate at the time of labor market entry with either the prevailing
unemployment rate at a lower age or that in the predicted year of graduation. Mansour (2009)
presents direct evidence on sample selection over the business cycle based on AFQT scores.
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resulting from initial labor market shocks.
Empirical evidence for countries outside the US and Canada yields broadly similar
findings. Kwon et al. (2010) mainly use data from the Swedish labor market.4 They
find that workers who enter the labor market during a boom are not only paid higher
wages, but that they are also promoted more quickly to higher ranks than those who
enter during an economic downturn. Stevens (2007) finds significant negative, albeit
small effects of initial conditions on wages in Germany (much smaller than those found
in the US and Canada). In contrast to all other studies, however, she finds that wage
losses from poor entry conditions do not fade away, but actually increase over time.5
The available empirical evidence also underlines the fact that negative wage effects
of initial labor market conditions are not confined to highly skilled workers. Genda
et al. (2010) focus on a separate comparison between men in Japan and the United
States with more or less education with respect to the effects of initial conditions.
They find negative effects of initial conditions for more highly skilled workers in both
countries. However, they only find negative wage effects for workers in Japan with
fewer skills. They argue that the specific hiring system and employment protection
drive the persistence of the effects for Japanese, while the market for less skilled
workers in the United States may indeed be quite close to a competitive market.
Consistent with this finding, Kondo (2008) reports that the initial effect of entering
the labor market during a recession on wages is less persistent for less skilled workers
and for workers with weak labor market attachment in the US.
In this chapter, we present estimates of the long-run effects of business cycle fluc-
tuations on young males’ wage profiles in the Austrian labor market and derive an
empirical estimate of the associated loss in lifetime earnings due to entering the labor
force during a recession, as opposed to entry during average aggregate conditions or
during a boom. We do so using Austrian social security records that contain detailed
individual earnings and employment histories for the universe of private-sector em-
ployees from 1972 until 2005. We complement the available empirical evidence on the
long-run wage effects of labor market entry conditions with an analysis for Austria, a
labor market characterized by a high level of employment protection and a centralized
wage bargaining structure. We focus on low and medium-skilled workers, while most
of the studies mentioned above focus on higher or even highest-skilled workers (in
4Previous studies for European countries have mainly focused on the long-run effects of initial
conditions on employment rather than wages (e.g. Burgess et al., 2003; Raaum and Røed, 2006).
5A similar analysis of wage effects for firm entry cohorts in the German manufacturing sector
is given in von Wachter and Bender (2008). However, their analysis is not confined to new labor
market entrants, but covers workers of all experience levels; their results are therefore not directly
comparable to the other studies mentioned.
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terms of formal education).6 In the second part of the analysis, we focus on changes
in the quality of workers’ first employer over the business cycle and the importance of
first employers for individuals’ entry and subsequent wages. Indeed, several previous
studies have shown that workers’ initial placements may have important effects not
only on their entry wages, but also on their subsequent wages (e.g. Oreopoulos et al.,
2012; von Wachter and Bender, 2006). More specifically, initial job or task assignment
may be important in the longer run if employers assign otherwise identical workers to
lower quality jobs or tasks in recession, and if jobs or tasks offer different opportunities
for the accrual of human capital (e.g. Gibbons and Waldman, 2006).7 Alternatively,
workers’ initial job or task assignment may have long lasting effects on wages if workers
accumulate human capital while on the job that is not fully transferable to other jobs
or tasks because it is specific to a worker’s task, occupation, or industry. In the third
and final part of the empirical analysis we provide complementary evidence on how
local entry conditions affect workers’ mobility behavior and unemployment experience
and how the quality of their subsequent employer changes as they start accumulating
labor market experience.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents
our data source, details the sample selection process, and discusses the construction
of our key measures. Section 2.3 presents the econometric approach for estimating
long-run wage effects of initial labor market conditions along with our main results.
We also present some robustness tests as well as some evidence on the importance of
endogenous labor market entry over the business cycle. In section 2.4, we focus on the
impact of initial labor market conditions on the quality of workers’ first employer, and
the importance of first employer on individuals’ subsequent wages. Section 2.5 studies
how initial conditions affect job mobility and unemployment and how the quality of
workers’ subsequent employers changes over time. Section 2.6 concludes.
6Note, however, that workers in the Austrian labor market typically have some, potentially very
specialized, vocational training, as a significant part of the initial vocational training in Austria is
provided by dual apprenticeship training schemes, i.e. practical training provided by firms coupled
with part-time compulsory attendance at a vocational school. Apprenticeships last from two to four
years, depending on occupation. Full-time vocational and technical schools provide an important
alternative to apprenticeship training, and also last up to four years. Details are available from the
report by the Federal Ministry for Education, the Arts and Culture (2008).
7Consistent with this line of argument, Kwon et al. (2010) find that workers who enter the labor
market during a boom are promoted more quickly and to higher ranks than those who enter during
a recession, and Mansour (2009) shows that workers entering in a recession are initially assigned to
lower paying jobs.
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2.2 Data and Sample
2.2.1 Data Source
We use individual-level social security records from the Austrian Social Security
Database (ASSD), a data source described in more detail in Zweimu¨ller et al. (2009).
The ASSD basically covers the universe of Austrian private sector workers from Jan-
uary 1972 until December 2005 and contains complete and precise information about
individuals’ annual earnings and daily employment histories. The data are therefore
ideally suited for studying the impact of labor market shocks on long-run wage profiles
because they allow us to construct individual wage profiles for a large number of labor
market entrants over a relatively long period of time.
2.2.2 Key Measures
Our dependent variable for most of the analysis is the real daily wage, i.e. the real
wage per actual day of work, adjusted to 2007 prices. Wages are deflated with the
consumer price index and include additional/special payments such as a 13th month’s
salary or holiday pay.8 Real daily wages are computed as the average earnings over
all employers in a given year. This means that we first sum total annual earnings over
all employers for any individual. We then divide overall earnings by the total number
of days worked in a given year, also summed over all employers for a given individual
and taking overlapping employment spells into account.
The regressor of main interest is the annual male unemployment rate, our measure
for external labor market conditions at the time individuals first enter the labor force.
We compute annual male unemployment rates from the individual level employment
histories contained in the ASSD raw data. This procedure has the advantage that we
can calculate unemployment rates back until 1972 (compared to published statistics,
which only reach back until 1978) and at different levels of cross-sectional aggregation.9
8The Austrian Central Social Security Administration collects these data with the purpose of
administering and calculating entitlements to old age pension benefits. For this reason, the ASSD
includes precise and comprehensive information on annual earnings and daily employment histories.
However, contributions to the old age pension system are capped because old age pension benefits are
limited to a maximum level. As a consequence, annual earnings are only recorded up to the threshold
which guarantees the maximum benefit level (“Ho¨chstbemessungsgrundlage”, HBGr). Similarly,
there is a base threshold below which no (otherwise mandatory) social security payments accrue
(“Geringfu¨gigkeitsgrenze”, GfGr). The two censoring points vary over time in real terms: The lower
censoring point increased from about 14e in 1978 to about 26e in 2005 (per day worked); the upper
censoring point increased from about 78e to 126e per workday over the same period of time.
9We decided to extract yearly male unemployment rates for the age groups 16 to 65 and 16 to
25, both at the state (”Bundesland”) level and at the common classification of territorial units for
statistics (NUTS) level. At the NUTS level, we use the most disaggregated level available (NUTS-3),
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Unless noted otherwise, we use the male unemployment rate for all workers aged
between 16 and 65 at the state level as our main regressor.
2.2.3 Sample Selection
Mainly for conceptual reasons, but also due to some data limitations, we do not work
with the universe of all labor market entrants but only with a specifically selected
sample. First, we restrict our attention to male entrants only. On the one hand,
female labor supply behavior over the life cycle is much more difficult to model than
male labor supply. On the other hand, we believe that the fact that most men work
full-time allows us to largely circumvent the problem that the ASSD does not contain
information on working hours. Second, we select those workers who start their first
regular employment spell sometime between 1978 and 2000, allowing us to observe
at least five additional years of earnings for each worker because the data run until
the end of 2005 (see also appendix 2.A). As a final restriction, we focus on workers
aged between 16 and 21 at the time they first enter the labor force (i.e. start their
first regular employment spell).10 Essentially, this restriction excludes individuals
with higher education (most importantly, individuals with a university degree), but it
should include all or most individuals with an apprenticeship training or an education
of similar length and scope, such as full-time vocational school.11 Our final sample
thus consists of male low and medium-skilled labor market entrants who started their
first regular employment between 1978 and 2000. We can observe these workers’ full
labor market career from the year they first enter into the labor force until the year
2005.
which corresponds to one or more political districts in Austria. There are total of 9 different states
and 35 different NUTS-3 regions in Austria. Yearly unemployment rates are within-year averages of
monthly unemployment rates.
10Because the ASSD does not contain a comprehensive measure for schooling, we use age at entry
into the labor force as proxy for education in the regressions below. To mitigate potential collinearity
with year of birth and year of entry, we use a slightly different variable as proxy in the regressions.
Specifically, we use the smaller of age at start of first regular employment and age at start of first
registered unemployment spell.
11Several arguments motivate the restriction on schooling. First, the timing of first labor market
entry, and thus the duration of schooling, may be endogenous. However, less skilled workers are pre-
sumably less likely to manipulate the duration of schooling. Furthermore, unobserved heterogeneity
resulting from, say, unobserved differences in inherent ability, is arguably a more urgent problem for
workers with higher skills. Moreover, we believe that our proxy for schooling works best for workers
with low education levels. Finally, only including less-skilled workers in the sample is an effective
way of dealing with right-censored wages (see also appendix 2.A).
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2.2.4 Sample Description
Because we can follow all individuals from the year of their first regular employment
until the end of the data in the year 2005, the resulting data set would have been
too large from a practical point of view. In the following, we therefore work with
a 30% random sample of all labor market entrants aged between 16 and 21 when
first entering into the labor force. This sample contains 217,587 unique individuals
and about 3.35 million individual wage observations (i.e. observations at the level of
individual×year).
Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics for our final analysis sample. The first panel
shows individual-level characteristics. The average labor market entrant in our sample
is about 19 years old when starting his first regular employment spell, and he holds his
first job for almost three years. The average age at the start of the first job dovetails
with the fact that mandatory schooling ends in the year when individuals attain the
age of 16 and that apprenticeships usually last for two to four years. The high fraction
of blue-collar occupations is consistent with our intention of only (or mainly) including
individuals who received some kind of vocational training. Interestingly, a substantial
fraction of the sample (about a third) experiences some unemployment before starting
the first regular employment spell (these individuals are registered for unemployment
benefits on average for somewhat more than one month). Consistent with this, we
find that age at first entry (our proxy for schooling) is about half a year lower than
age at the start of the first regular job, reflecting the fact that the transition from
education to work often involves short periods of non-employment.
The second panel shows various unemployment rates as well as the number of
labor market entrants. The different unemployment rates use different aggregation
levels (cf. footnote 9) and refer to different age groups, but all of them are limited to
the male population only. The unemployment rate in the year of labor market entry
averages about 6.6%, irrespective of the chosen aggregation level (states or NUTS-3
units). Youth unemployment rates at the time of entry are somewhat lower than
overall unemployment rates and equal about 5% on average. Finally, about 3,750
(2,430) male individuals aged between 16 and 21 (22 and 30) enter the labor market
in any given state and year in the period 1978-2000.12
The remaining part of the table shows the distribution of our sample of labor
market entrants across the nine different states and across years. The distribution
across states mainly reflects differences in population size. It may, however, also
reflect other differences between states (e.g. differences in the age distribution of
12The number of labor market entrants aged between 22 and 30 are used as control variables in
some of our model specifications.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics, male labor market entrants 1978–2000
Mean Standard deviation
Individual-level characteristics:
Age at start of first regular job 19.195 (1.007)
Age at first entry into the labor force 18.669 (1.431)
Duration of first regular job (years) 2.847 (4.335)
Any unemployment before first job 0.306 (0.461)
Unemployment days before first job 42.649 (101.181)
Blue-collar 0.546 (0.498)
White-collar 0.176 (0.380)
Aggregate-level variables:
State level unemployment rate 6.595 (2.897)
NUTS-3 level unemployment rate 6.645 (3.144)
State level youth unemployment rate 4.941 (1.790)
Number of entrants aged 16-21 3, 767.283 (1, 451.150)
Number of entrants aged 22-30a 2, 431.488 (2, 070.294)
State of first entry into the labor market:
Vienna 0.179 (0.383)
Lower Austria 0.173 (0.378)
Burgenland 0.025 (0.156)
Upper Austria 0.194 (0.395)
Styria 0.147 (0.354)
Carinthia 0.067 (0.251)
Salzburg 0.071 (0.256)
Tyrol 0.092 (0.289)
Vorarlberg 0.053 (0.223)
Year of first entry into the labor market:
1978 0.033 (0.178)
1979 0.039 (0.194)
1980 0.046 (0.208)
1981 0.045 (0.207)
1982 0.042 (0.202)
1983 0.044 (0.206)
1984 0.048 (0.213)
1985 0.047 (0.212)
1986 0.046 (0.210)
1987 0.046 (0.210)
1988 0.048 (0.214)
1989 0.050 (0.217)
1990 0.049 (0.216)
1991 0.046 (0.209)
1992 0.042 (0.201)
1993 0.038 (0.190)
1994 0.041 (0.198)
1995 0.040 (0.196)
1996 0.038 (0.192)
1997 0.040 (0.195)
1998 0.041 (0.197)
1999 0.043 (0.204)
2000 0.048 (0.214)
Number of unique individuals 217,587
Notes: All aggregate-level variables are computed from the individual-level
raw data of the ASSD (see footnote 9). See also notes of table A.1. a The
number of entrants aged between 22 and 30 are used as control variables.
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women). The distribution of entrants across years on the other hand looks fairly
uniform, implying that the aggregate number of entrants aged between 16 and 21 has
not changed much over time.
2.3 The Persistence of Initial Labor Market Shocks
2.3.1 Graphical Evidence on the Evolution of Wages and Ini-
tial Conditions
We start with a simple graphical depiction of our two key measures (i.e. cohorts’
wage profiles and the initial local unemployment rate). First, figure 2.1 shows wage
profiles by entry cohort for all labor market cohorts who first entered the labor force
between 1978 and 2000. The black dots therefore represent average starting wages
for each entry cohort and the dashed grey line thus shows how starting wages evolve
over time. Clearly, real starting wages have increased significantly over the period
of analysis, from about 38e in 1978 to about 50e in 2000. Also note that there is
some cyclical movement in starting wages over time which we expect to be related to
economic conditions prevailing in that year.
Figure 2.1: Long-run wage profiles, by labor market entry cohort
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Notes: The figure shows average log real daily wages by calendar year for each labor market
entry cohort from 1978 to 2000.
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The solid colored lines, on the other hand, represent long-run wage profiles of
cohorts entering the labor market in different years. Cohorts’ wages clearly follow an
approximate concave path over time, implying that wage growth is highest in earlier
working years and then strongly flattens later on. The figure shows, for example,
that the 1978 entry cohort starts with a real wage of about 38e per workday and
experiences a raise in real wage up to about 97e by the year 2005. On average, this
cohort’s compensation therefore more than doubles in real terms within the first 27
years of labor market experience. Focusing again on the 1978 entry cohort, we see
that this cohort’s average wage grows by approximately 146% (= [exp(.9)− 1] · 100%)
in the first 27 years of experience. Evidently, most of this wage increase happens at
the early stage of the labor market career (i.e. the wage increase in the first ten years
equals about 86% (= [exp(.62)− 1] · 100%)).13
Figure 2.2: Fluctuations in state-level unemployment rates, 1978-2000
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Notes: The figure shows male unemployment rates for workers aged between 16 and 65,
aggregated at the level of the state (“Bundesland”) and computed from the individual-level
raw data of the ASSD. Two of the nine states are graphically highlighted. “Vorarlberg” is
situated in the western part of Austria (bordering Germany and Switzerland). “Burgenland”
is located at the eastern border of Austria (bordering Hungary in the east and Slovenia in the
south). Panel (b) shows residuals from a regression of the initial unemployment rate on a full
set of year and state of entry dummies.
Panel (a) of figure 2.2 shows the evolution of state level unemployment rates which
we use as our indicator for external labor market conditions at the time individuals
first enter the labor force. This figure shows that the period from 1978 to 2000 covers
13Wage profiles of different entry cohorts have somewhat distinct overall shapes. More specifically,
the figure shows that returns to experience generally decrease over time, meaning that younger entry
cohorts have considerably lower returns to labor market experience than older cohorts. For example,
the 1995 cohort only realizes an average wage increase of about 58% (= [exp(.46)− 1] · 100%) in the
first ten years, thus less smaller than that of the corresponding increase of the 1978 entry cohort.
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several periods of both boom and downturn, and that the identifying variation in
initial labor market conditions therefore does not only stem from a few neighboring
labor market cohorts. The figure also illustrates that states not only differ in the
level of unemployment but also with respect to cyclical variations around a longer
run trend: although all states see an increase over the whole observation period in
general, there are marked cyclical differences across states.14 Panel (b) of figure 2.2
shows that our observation period spans several ups and downs in the business cycle,
and that there is considerable differentiation in the strength of these variations across
states. We thus have both sufficient cross-sectional and longitudinal variation in our
key regressor that we can use to pin down the effect of local business cycle fluctuations
on wages.
2.3.2 Econometric Framework
Because we primarily aim to estimate the long-run impact of economic shocks at the
time individuals started their first jobs, we must take care to allow the association
between initial conditions and wage to become weaker or stronger as labor market
experience increases while also using a generally flexible functional form of wage pro-
files. Taking these issues into account, our basic and most parsimonious econometric
model is the following:
ln(yit) = ur
0
j[i]α1 + κ(expit)α2 + [ur
0
j[i] · κ(expit)]α3 + ψj(t0)i + φt0i + θt + it, (2.1)
where yit denotes the real daily wage of individual i in calendar year t, expit potential
labor market experience of i in year t, and ur0j[i] the unemployment rate as prevailing
in state j at the time individual i first entered the labor market. Function κ(·) denotes
that we allow for a flexible functional form with respect to labor market experience.15
Note that we allow the effect of the initial unemployment rate on current wages to
vary as potential labor market experience increases by including the interaction terms
between the experience polynomials and the initial unemployment rate. We also
include a full set of dummies for state at entry and year of entry, denoted by ψ
j(t0)
i and
14For example, and as highlighted in the figure, Burgenland (located in southeastern Austria)
experienced a huge increase in the unemployment rate from about 3% in the late 1970s to about
8% in the first half of the 1980s, and then to about 9% in the second half of the 1980s. Vorarlberg
(situated in western Austria), in contrast, experienced only a modest increase from about 1% on the
1970s to about 3% in the 1980s. In 1992, however, Vorarlberg underwent a sharp decline in the local
labor market conditions, when unemployment jumped from about 3% to about 7–8%.
15Specifically, we include the first three polynomial terms of potential labor market experience.
We chose the number of polynomial terms on the basis of a non-parametric, and therefore fully
flexible, wage-experience model. The first three polynomial terms appear sufficient for reproducing
the wage-experience profile that a corresponding non-parametric specification predicts.
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φt0i , respectively, throughout the analysis. Finally, we also control for the aggregate
business cycle θt which we parameterize using the aggregate yearly unemployment
rate, the log aggregate number of workers, as well as log aggregate annual earnings.
As we will discuss in more detail below, our baseline (i.e. our preferred) specifica-
tion will include some additional regressors:
ln(yit) = ur
0
j[i]α1 + κ(expit)α2 + [ur
0
j[i] · κ(expit)]α3 + ψj(t0)i + φt0i + θt
+ x0iβ1 + [φ
t0
i · κ(expit)]β2 + ln(n0j[i])β3 + it, (2.2)
where the second row contains these additional variables. First, x0i denotes a small set
of individual-level controls, i.e. our proxy for schooling and two indicator variables for
workers’ initial occupation (blue or white-collar). These variables are predetermined
in the sense that they relate to an individual’s first regular employment spell or to the
time before having started to work (i.e. there is no time index for these variables). We
also include the full set of interaction terms between year of entry and the polynomial
in potential experience as well as the log number of labor market entrants aged 16-21
and aged 22-30 at the state level. The latter two variables are included to control for
changes in the relative number of entrants aged 16-21 (relative to all entrants aged in
the age bracket 16-30); the former set of controls allows for cohort-specific differences
in the wage profile that are unrelated to differences in local initial unemployment rates
but due to, say, changes in the production of education across cohorts.
In either case, parameters α1 to α3 describe individuals’ wage-experience profiles
as a function of the initial unemployment rate and are the parameters of main interest.
Specifically, α1 is the elasticity of wages with respect to the initial unemployment rate
in the year of first entry (i.e. in the year where labor market experience is equal to 0),
while α3 tells us how the effect of initial conditions changes as labor market experience
increases.
One important complication both specifications imply relates to the fact that the
local initial unemployment rate does not vary over time for any given individual. For
this reason, we cannot use standard panel data estimators such as the fixed-effects
or first-differences estimator because these methods not only eliminate all unobserved
time-invariant heterogeneity but also all variation in the key regressor. We therefore
rely on estimation methods that use the untransformed data. We also have to consider
that our key regressor is observed at a higher level of aggregation than the dependent
variable, a situation that may lead to grossly misleading statistical inference (Moulton,
1986). All standard errors we report are therefore clustered by cells defined by year
at first entry × state of first entry (there are 9 states and 23 entry years, resulting in
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207 distinct cells).16
2.3.3 Main Results: Initial Labor Market Conditions and
Wages
Table 2.2 shows our main results, building up from our most parsimonious specification
represented by equation (2.1) to our preferred specification as given by equation (2.2).
The top panel shows, for each specification, point estimates of the parameters (i.e. α1
and α3) describing the effect of initial conditions on wages at the top and estimated
semi-elasticities of wages with respect to the initial local unemployment rate at specific
values of potential labor market experience (i.e. potential labor market experience of
0, 5, 10, 15, and 20 years, respectively) in the middle of the table. For example,
εyur(5) denotes the estimated semi-elasticity of the real daily wage with respect to the
initial unemployment rate at five years of potential labor market experience. It thus
corresponds to the estimated relative change in wages resulting from a one percentage
point increase in the initial unemployment rate.
The first column shows point estimates for our most parsimonious specification as
spelled out in equation (2.1). As expected, there is a negative effect of the initial local
unemployment on wages in the year of entry. Specifically, the semi-elasticity of wages
with respect to the initial unemployment rate equals -0.009 in the year of entry. A
one percentage point increase in the local initial unemployment rate is thus predicted
to lower starting wages by 0.9%. The corresponding standard error equals 0.002,
and thus the immediate wage effect is statistically highly significant. Moreover, the
middle panel of the table shows that there is substantial persistence of this negative
wage effect, and a negative and significant effect of initial labor market conditions
remains as much as twenty years after first entry into the labor market. In fact, the
point estimate of the semi-elasticity at twenty years of experience is even larger than
the immediate wage penalty.
We add our small set of individual-level controls (i.e. our proxy for schooling and
two dummy variables indicating a worker’s initial occupation) in the second specifi-
cation. This has some impact on the estimated wage effects, especially in the year
of entry into the labor market (the immediate semi-elasticity of wages decreases from
0.009 to 0.007), but otherwise the coefficients are remarkably similar and a negative
and strongly persistent wage effect of bad entry conditions remains, as the middle
panel of table 2.2 reflects.
16We also computed standard errors that simultaneously account for clustering at both levels
for our main estimates. This yields standard errors that are virtually indistinguishable from those
actually reported.
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Table 2.2: The long-run wage effects of initial labor market conditions
Dependent variable ln(real daily wage)
Mean 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257
Standard deviation 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380
ur0 −0.009??? −0.007??? −0.009??? −0.009??? −0.010??? −0.009???
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
exp · ur0 0.000 0.000 0.001?? 0.001?? 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
exp2 · ur0 −0.000??? −0.000??? −0.000??? −0.000??? −0.000? −0.000?
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
exp3 · ur0 0.000??? 0.000??? 0.000??? 0.000??? 0.000? 0.000?
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
εyur(0) −0.009??? −0.007??? −0.009??? −0.009??? −0.010??? −0.009???
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
εyur(5) −0.011??? −0.010??? −0.010??? −0.010??? −0.010??? −0.009???
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
εyur(10) −0.017??? −0.016??? −0.015??? −0.015??? −0.012??? −0.012???
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
εyur(15) −0.021??? −0.020??? −0.019??? −0.019??? −0.015??? −0.014???
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
εyur(20) −0.015??? −0.015??? −0.014??? −0.014??? −0.018??? −0.017???
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Potential experience Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Longitudinal controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Year of entry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of entry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies (biannual) No No Yes Yes No No
Year of entry × κ(exp) No No No No Yes Yes
Number of entrants No No No No No Yes
Number of observations 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075
Adjusted R-Squared 0.286 0.325 0.326 0.326 0.327 0.327
Lifetime loss 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.013
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by state at entry × year of entry.
exp and ur0 denote potential labor market experience (in years) and the initial unemployment rate
(in percentages), respectively. εyur(k) denotes the estimated semi-elasticity of wages with respect to
the initial unemployment rate, evaluated at k years of potential labor market experience.
We replace our set of longitudinal controls with a set of biannual year dummies
in the third column. This yields estimates that are very similar to those from the
specification with parametric business cycle controls. The fourth column includes
both the set of biannual year dummies and our set of parametric longitudinal controls.
Again, the estimates hardly change, although the estimated semi-elasticities at higher
values of labor market experience are somewhat smaller than in the specification with
only a parameterized trend.
We next add the full set of interaction terms between the year of entry and the
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experience terms. This allows for changes in the wage profile across entry cohorts that
are unrelated to initial conditions in a fully flexible way. The estimates again remain
more or less stable.
We finally add the log number of labor market entrants aged 16-21 and 22-30 in
the sixth column because there was a substantive drop in the relative number of labor
market entrants aged 16-21 relative to all entrants aged below 30. The specification
underlying the estimates shown in column 6 thus corresponds to the specification
of equation (2.2). Our baseline specification still yields an immediate negative and
statistically significant wage effect of about -0.009. Moreover, we find the wage penalty
resulting from entering the labor market in times of high local unemployment to be
highly persistent. In fact, the wage penalty is even slightly increasing with labor
market experience, similar to what is found in Stevens (2007).
2.3.4 Robustness
Table 2.3 presents some different robustness checks. For the ease of comparison, the
first column simply reproduces our baseline estimates from column 6 of table 2.2.
A first robustness check relates to the fact that a non-negligible number of wage
observations is censored.17 Column 2 thus shows quantile (i.e. median) regression
estimates of our baseline specification. The short-run estimates are identical but the
estimated wage losses turn out to be moderately larger at higher values of labor market
experience. More specifically, ε0ur(5) is already slightly larger when estimated using a
quantile regression, but the quantile regression estimate of ε0ur(20) is as much as 35%
larger than the corresponding OLS estimate. If anything, censored wages will thus
lead us to underestimate the wage effects resulting from labor market entry in times
of high local unemployment.
We add the interaction terms between our longitudinal controls and the experience
terms in the third column to allow for the possibility that variations in the business
cycle affect workers differentially at different stages of their labor market career. This,
however, has no discernible effect on the estimated coefficients of our key parameters.
Most of the estimated semi-elasticities are virtually identical to our baseline estimates.
We use different unemployment rates in columns 4 and 5 as another robustness
check. We use unemployment rates at the NUTS-3 rather than at the state level in
the fourth column (cf. footnote 9). Using the unemployment rate at the NUTS-3
level results in a smaller initial and a somewhat less persistent wage effect. This
17Appendix table A.1 shows that only few wage observations are censored in the year of entry.
However, top censored wages become much more frequent as workers accumulate labor market ex-
perience.
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is most likely due to the fact that we also include entry-region fixed effects at a
finer aggregation level which tends to pick up more of the variation in wages.18 The
specification in the fifth column uses state-level youth unemployment rates instead of
overall unemployment rates. The resulting wage effects are somewhat larger, but still
reasonably close to our main estimates based on overall unemployment rates.
Table 2.3: Sensitivity analysis
Dependent variable ln(real daily wage) ln(earn.)
Mean 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257 9.991
Standard deviation 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.656
ur0 −0.009??? −0.009??? −0.009??? −0.005??? −0.006??? −0.007???
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
exp · ur0 0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.001?? −0.001?
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
exp2 · ur0 −0.000? −0.000?? −0.000? −0.000?? 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
exp3 · ur0 0.000? 0.000 0.000?? 0.000??? 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
εyur(0) −0.009??? −0.009??? −0.009??? −0.005??? −0.006??? −0.007???
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
εyur(5) −0.009??? −0.011??? −0.009??? −0.007??? −0.011??? −0.012???
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
εyur(10) −0.012??? −0.015??? −0.012??? −0.010??? −0.014??? −0.016???
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
εyur(15) −0.014??? −0.019??? −0.015??? −0.013??? −0.016??? −0.019???
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
εyur(20) −0.017??? −0.023??? −0.017??? −0.015??? −0.017??? −0.021???
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Estimation method OLS LAD OLS OLS OLS OLS
Unemployment rate State State State NUTS-3 Youth State
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Longit. controls × κ(exp) No No Yes No No No
Number of observations 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075
Adjusted R-Squared 0.327 0.328 0.330 0.327 0.223
Lifetime loss 0.013 0.016 0.013 0.010 0.014 0.016
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by state at entry × year of entry.
The specification in column 1 is the same as in column 6 of table 2.2. All specifications include
the same set of controls as in column 6 of table 2.2 (“baseline controls”). The dependent variable
is the log real daily wage in columns 1-5 and log real annual earnings in column 6. We use the
state unemployment rate for men aged 16-65 (“State”) in columns 1-3 and 6, the NUTS-3 level
unemployment rate for men aged 16-65 (“NUTS-3”) in column 4, and the state-level unemployment
rate for men aged 16-25 (“Youth”) in column 5.
18It may also reflect endogeneity of the local unemployment rate at lower aggregation levels, due
to the fact that workers move from regions with high unemployment to those with lower levels of
unemployment (Wozniak, 2010).
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Finally, the specification in the sixth column shows results when we use log an-
nual earnings instead of log daily wages as the dependent variable. In this case we
get somewhat larger, but still very similar estimates than in the baseline case. The
comparison with the effect on wages also implies that workers entering during times of
high local unemployment not only suffer from lower subsequent wages, but also from
less employment days throughout their labor market career (see also section 2.5 below
where we discuss the effect of initial conditions on job mobility and unemployment).
2.3.5 Endogenous Labor Market Entry
Instrumental Variable Estimates
One important issue that we have not yet considered is the fact that the composition
of the sample of labor market entrants may be endogenous with respect to variation in
the local business cycle, which may lead to inconsistent estimates of the effect of initial
conditions on wages.19 Various studies have tried to tackle this issue by instrumenting
the unemployment rate at labor market entry with the unemployment rate at some
earlier age or with the unemployment rate at the predicted date of graduation.20
We have thus tried a similar approach, instrumenting the local unemployment rate
at entry with the local unemployment rate at age 16, the age at which mandatory
schooling ends in Austria.
However, we have some serious reservations, at least in our context, regarding
the validity of this instrumental variable strategy. Most importantly, the instrument
may have a direct effect on subsequent wages, in which case IV estimates will be
biased (e.g. Angrist and Krueger, 1994). To see why this may occur, note that, the
majority of individuals, at least in our sample, start an apprenticeship training at the
age of 16, as this is the age when mandatory schooling ends. In Austria, moreover,
19Bils (1985) and more recently Solon et al. (1994) and Blundell et al. (2003) have put forth this
line of argument. In fact, the timing of labor force entry and thus the composition of labor market
cohorts may be endogenous for several distinct reasons. First, some potential labor market entrants
may refrain from entering the labor market altogether. Second, both the choice of education as well as
the duration of schooling may be endogenous, as both job prospects are weak and opportunity costs
of schooling low in times of high unemployment. Third, some workers may simply delay their entry
when faced with unfavorable entry conditions, either by registering for unemployment benefits or by
staying out of the labor force until they find a job. Whatever the underlying reason, if those workers
who do not immediately get a job are a selected group of all workers who intend to enter employment
in a given year, then the composition of the actual entrants changes along with corresponding changes
in the unemployment rate and thus potentially biases the estimated effect of the initial unemployment
rate on wages.
20Kahn (2010), Kondo (2008) and Oreopoulos et al. (2012) use a similar instrumental variable
strategy. OLS and IV estimates are similar in Oreopoulos et al. (2012), but IV are substantially
larger in both Kondo (2008) and Kahn (2010). Kwon et al. (2010) and Stevens (2007), the two
European studies, only show OLS estimates.
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most of the practical training is directly provided by firms which are free to decide
whether they want to offer apprenticeships. It is thus quite obvious that labor market
conditions may have an impact on firms’ decision to offer apprenticeships.21 Moreover,
economic conditions may not only impact the number, but also the type (i.e. quality)
of apprenticeships firms offer.
Table 2.4 shows OLS and instrumental variable estimates. As before, the first
column replicates our baseline estimates from column 6 of table 2.2. We first compare
our baseline estimates to the corresponding 2SLS estimates that instrument the local
unemployment rate at first entry with the local unemployment rate at age 16, shown
in the fifth column. The 2SLS estimate of the semi-elasticity in the year of entry into
the labor force is more than six times larger than the corresponding OLS estimate
(-0.059 versus -0.009), and the lifetime loss in the case of 2SLS is about four times
larger than in the baseline case (0.052 versus 0.013). While it appears reasonable that
2SLS estimates are larger than OLS estimates, signifying positive sample selection
in economic downturns, the size of the difference between the estimates is almost
suspiciously large. Thus let us examine the reduced form estimates as well, shown
in column 3. Note that the immediate and medium-run wage losses are considerably
larger than those in column 1, while the estimates appear to converge at higher values
of labor market experience. It seems hard to rationalize the difference between columns
1 and 3 without considering the possibility of a direct effect of ur16 on the dependent
variable.
Finally, since both our proxy for the completed duration of schooling and/or train-
ing as well as individuals’ initial occupation may be endogenous with respect to the
unemployment rate age 16, we also show estimates that do not control for these charac-
teristics. Our baseline estimates are hardly any different, but note that the estimates
using the unemployment rate at age 16 increase considerably, resulting in 2SLS es-
timates that are as much as ten times larger than the corresponding OLS estimates
(compare columns 6 and 2). These estimates are presumably too large to be plausible,
but we think they can be easily rationalized by acknowledging that the instrument
has a direct impact on wages (through its impact on individuals’ schooling/training)
in which case 2SLS estimates are upwards biased.
21To the best of our knowledge, there is no relevant empirical evidence for Austria. However,
Muehlemann et al. (2009) provide evidence consistent with this line of argument for Switzerland,
which has an apprenticeship system very similar to that of Austria. Their results thus presumably
carry over to Austria.
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Table 2.4: OLS versus 2SLS estimates
Dependent variable ln(real daily wage)
Mean 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257
Standard deviation 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380
ur0 −0.009??? −0.011??? −0.059??? −0.135???
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.017)
exp · ur0 0.000 0.000 0.005??? 0.005???
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
exp2 · ur0 −0.000? −0.000 −0.001??? −0.001???
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
exp3 · ur0 0.000? 0.000 0.000??? 0.000???
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ur16 −0.029??? −0.052???
(0.002) (0.003)
exp · ur16 0.004??? 0.004???
(0.001) (0.001)
exp2 · ur16 −0.000??? −0.000???
(0.000) (0.000)
exp3 · ur16 0.000??? 0.000???
(0.000) (0.000)
εyur(0) −0.009??? −0.011??? −0.029??? −0.052??? −0.059??? −0.135???
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.017)
εyur(5) −0.009??? −0.011??? −0.015??? −0.039??? −0.044??? −0.124???
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.016)
εyur(10) −0.012??? −0.013??? −0.015??? −0.039??? −0.045??? −0.132???
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.016)
εyur(15) −0.014??? −0.015??? −0.019??? −0.045??? −0.053??? −0.146???
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.017)
εyur(20) −0.017??? −0.017??? −0.021??? −0.050??? −0.055??? −0.152???
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.017)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes No Yes No Yes No
Number of observations 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075
Adjusted R-Squared 0.327 0.287 0.328 0.296 0.323 0.249
Lifetime loss 0.013 0.014 0.019 0.046 0.052 0.143
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by state at entry × year of entry.
The first column replicates the baseline estimates from column 6 of table 2.2. All specifications
include controls for potential labor market experience, year of entry, state at entry, longitudinal
controls, the interactions between year of entry and κ(exp), as well as controls for the number of
labor market entrants (“baseline controls”). 2SLS estimates instrument the local unemployment
rate at entry (ur0) with the local unemployment rate at age 16 (ur16).
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Direct Evidence on Endogenous Labor Market Entry
We complement the evidence from our IV estimates with some more direct evidence
on compositional effects from labor market entry conditions. A first piece of evidence
is provided in table 2.5 that directly examines the association of entry conditions and
the number of labor market entrants in different age brackets. In its most basic form,
the estimated regression is:
ln(ejt) = ur
0
jtα + ψj + θt + εjt, (2.3)
with the dependent variable being the log number of labor market entrants in state j
and year t. The unemployment rate is again denoted by ur0jt. We also include state
and year fixed effects, denoted by ψj and θt, respectively. The first panel of table
2.5 suggests that there is a non-negligible and negative effect of current labor market
conditions on the number of entrants aged 16-21. The number of entrants aged 16-21
is estimated to decrease by 2.8% for an increase in the local initial unemployment
rate by one percentage point. At the same time, the second and third column of
table 2.5 show that there is no statistically significant effect on either the number of
entrants aged 22-30 or the number of entrants aged 16-30, suggesting that some of the
potential entrants with low or medium duration of schooling/training are permanently
discouraged from entering the labor market at all, and thus that sample selection over
the business cycle occurs through changes at the extensive margin.
Table 2.5: Number of labor market entrants
Dependent variable ln(#entrants ln(#entrants ln(#entrants
aged 16-21) laged 22-30) aged 16-30)
Mean 7.782 7.058 8.229
Standard deviation 0.662 1.030 0.720
ur0 −0.028??? 0.009 −0.001
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 207 207 207
Adjusted R-Squared 0.981 0.986 0.984
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the log number of male labor market entrants in a given age group
aggregated at state at entry × year of entry cells.
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Table 2.6 complements the evidence from table 2.5 by looking at the association
between the initial local unemployment rate and our two proxies for schooling. Specif-
ically, we regress our proxy for schooling si on the local initial unemployment rate and
additional controls:
si = ur
0
j[i]α + ψj + θt + εi, (2.4)
with ur0j[i] again denoting the local initial unemployment rate, and with ψj and θt
denoting fixed effects for state at entry and year of entry, respectively. Based on
the results from table 2.4 above, we also include the local unemployment rate at age
16 in some specifications. The results for our first measure of schooling, age at first
entry into the labor market, yield somewhat mixed results (though the mixed results
are probably due to the nature of our schooling proxies). While the first column
shows a small positive impact of entry conditions, we get a non-significant estimate
once we control for individuals’ unemployment before their first regular employment.
However, once we also include the unemployment rate at age 16, the coefficient on
the local unemployment rate at entry turns significantly positive, while the point
estimate on the unemployment rate at age 16 is statistically negative (consistent with
our discussion of local labor market conditions at age 16 in section 2.3.5 above).
Table 2.6: Age at first entry into the labor market and age at start of first regular job
Dependent variable Age at labor market entry Age at start of first regular job
Mean 18.669 18.669 18.669 18.669 19.195 19.195 19.195
Standard deviation 1.431 1.431 1.431 1.431 1.007 1.007 1.007
ur0 −0.037???−0.010 −0.006 0.438???−0.007 0.448??? 0.216???
(0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.032) (0.005) (0.034) (0.021)
ur16 −0.662??? −0.679??? −0.328???
(0.028) (0.029) (0.022)
Age at first entry 0.529???
(0.020)
State of entry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of entry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unempl. before first job No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of entrants No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 217,587 217,587 217,587 217,587 217,587 217,587 217,587
Adjusted R-Squared 0.043 0.267 0.267 0.397 0.057 0.333 0.674
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by state at entry × year of entry.
The second part of table 2.6 shows similar results for our second proxy for school-
ing, age at the start of one’s first regular job. Once we control for the unemployment
rate at age 16, we get a positive coefficient on the local unemployment rate at entry.
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Also note, however, that the estimated coefficients imply rather small effects on the
average length of schooling/training in any case.22
Taken together, the results from table 2.5 and table 2.6 suggest that there is
some, arguably positive, sample selection in times of high local unemployment rates.
For this reason, we believe that it is plausible to argue that our baseline estimates
provide a lower bound on the true effect of labor market entry conditions on wages
(or, rather, the effect of labor market conditions on wages in the absence of any
sample selection issues). More importantly, the OLS estimates probably better reflect
the overall effects of labor market entry conditions because the compositional effects,
which also are caused by the cyclical variation in aggregate conditions, are factored
in as well.
2.3.6 Quantitative Implications
Our estimates so far imply a non-negligible negative long-run wage effect from entering
the labor market when the local unemployment rate is high. This is illustrated at
the bottom of each table, which, where applicable, shows an approximate estimate
of the lifetime loss in wages associated with a hypothetical increase in the initial
unemployment rate by one percentage point. The lifetime loss in wages (or any other
outcome considered) is computed simply as the average of the accumulated wage losses
within the first twenty years of labor market experience.
Our estimates from tables 2.2 and 2.3 imply that an increase in the initial local
unemployment rate by one percentage point is associated with an approximate lifetime
loss in wages in the range of about 1% to 1.6%, and our preferred specification yields
an approximate lifetime loss of 1.3% for an increase in the local initial unemployment
rate by one percentage point. Moreover, according to our argumentation from the
preceding section, this likely represents a lower bound (which in turn is consistent
with the fact that our 2SLS estimates are larger than our baseline estimates).
Finally, to better understand the true size and economic meaning of these numbers,
note that the estimated returns to apprenticeship training in Austria are on the order
of about 3% to 5% per year (Fersterer et al., 2008). The estimated wage loss resulting
from an increase in the local initial unemployment rate by one percentage point thus
approximately equals the value of about 0.26-0.4 a year of apprenticeship training.23
22This result is perhaps not surprising because apprenticeship positions usually have a fixed dura-
tion of either three of four years. Thus, in principle, it may be possible to observe no change in the
average length of schooling/training even if there is considerable downranking to lower paying jobs.
23It is reassuring that the estimated coefficient on the proxy for schooling/training equals about
0.046 in our baseline specification (i.e. column 6 of table 2.2), which is consistent with the reported
external evidence on the returns on apprenticeship training in Austria.
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This comparison emphasizes that unfavorable labor market entry conditions indeed
have a sizable negative effect on workers’ lifetime wages.
2.4 Initial Job Assignment
2.4.1 Quality of Workers’ First Employer
Previous evidence strongly suggests that a worker’s first employer may play an impor-
tant role in explaining not only the immediate, but also the longer-run wage effects
resulting from labor market entry conditions (Oreopoulos et al., 2012; von Wachter
and Bender, 2006). Different mechanisms may explain the observed importance of
individuals’ initial placement. One important mechanism that may explain cohort ef-
fects in wages starts with the observation that there is cyclical variation in job and/or
task assignment within jobs over the business cycle and that high ability workers are
assigned to jobs with lower average quality in recessions (e.g. Devereux, 2000).24 If,
moreover, these jobs offer different opportunities for accruing human capital or if, al-
ternatively, a substantial part of human capital accumulated on the job is specific to a
worker’s task, occupation, and/or industry, then initial job and/or task assignment is
probably able to explain a significant part of the observed persistent wage effects re-
sulting from unfavorable initial labor market conditions (e.g. Gibbons and Waldman,
2006).25 A similar argument is put forth in a more recent study by Liu et al. (2012),
who argue that cyclical skill mismatch can generate persistent wage effects if at least
part of the human capital acquired in a worker’s first job/task is non-transferable to
subsequent jobs/tasks and assuming that previously acquired (and potentially supe-
rior) human capital depreciates while not put to use.
Inspired by this evidence, we also provide an analysis of the association of initial
labor market conditions and the quality of a worker’s first job, which we complement
with evidence on search frictions. We use a variety of different measures of the quality
of workers’ first employment. The first two measures are firm-level compensation
measures, but we also look at a firm’s size and age and the possibility that it might
“disappear” within the following year or the following four years.26 We regress each
24In line with these findings, Mansour (2009) finds that the quality of a worker’s first job is lower
when entry happens during high unemployment, even though cohorts entering during recession are
positively selected.
25See Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010) for evidence on task specific, Kambourov and Manovskii
(2009) on occupation specific, and Neal (1995) or Parent (2000) on industry specific human capital.
Sullivan (2010) provides evidence that both occupation and industry specific human capital are
decisive in determining the level of wages.
26The “disappearance” of a firm identifier does not necessarily coincide with a plant closure because
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of these measures on the initial local unemployment rate and a couple of additional
control variables:
ω
k(t0)
i = ur
0
j[i]α + ψ
j(t0)
i + φ
t0
i + x
0
iβ1 + ln(n
0
j[i])β2 + i, or (2.5a)
ω
k(t0)
i = ur
0
j[i]α + ψ
j(t0)
i + φ
t0
i + x
0
iβ1 + ln(n
0
j[i])β2 + λ
k(t0)
i + i, (2.5b)
where ω
k(t0)
i denotes some outcome for individual i who first enters the labor market in
year t0 at employer k. The local initial unemployment rate ur
0
j[i] is again the regressor
of main interest. We also include the same set of individual-level controls x0i , the
log number of labor market entrants n0j[i], as well as a full set of dummy variables
indicating the state a worker resides in at entry, ψ
j(t0)
i , and year of entry, φ
t0
i . As above,
standard errors are clustered by year at entry × state at entry. We show results with
and without controls for an employer’s industry affiliation λ
k(t0)
i because of potential
endogeneity. Estimates of α are shown in table 2.7; panel (a) shows estimates without
industry controls, panel (b) shows estimates including industry controls.
Consistent with previous evidence, we find considerable cyclical variation in most of
our performance measures for workers’ initial employer. Not surprisingly, the first two
columns of table 2.7 show that entry in times of high local unemployment is associated
with starting one’s labor market career with an employer who pays considerably lower
compensation on average. Initial employers of workers entering at different labor
market conditions also differ in other dimensions, however. Specifically, columns 3-6
show that workers entering during times of high local unemployment also tend to enter
the labor market through firms that are younger and smaller than first employers of
workers who enter the labor force when the labor market is tight. More remarkably,
the final two columns show that those individuals entering when unemployment is
high are also much more likely to end up with an employer who is doomed to fail in
the near future.
The comparison between the two panels of table 2.7 further suggests that some of
the downgrading during bad entry conditions occurs both across and within industries.
For example, the first two columns show that the estimated coefficients on wages and
earnings are smaller if we control for industry affiliation of workers’ initial employers,
implying that part of the negative effect on wages/earnings stems from the fact that
workers are more likely to start working with an employer from an industry that offers
lower compensation.
a firm identifier may also disappear for other reasons (e.g. because of a take-over by another firm).
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Because we neither have direct nor detailed measures of the schooling and training
actually acquired, we cannot provide any direct assessment on the importance of skill
mismatch as in Liu et al. (2012). We can, however, provide some direct evidence on
the cyclicality of search frictions (which seems to be a natural precondition for skill
mismatch). Table 2.8 shows that workers who enter during high unemployment not
only end up working at a firm that is economically weaker, but that they also have a
more difficult time of finding an employer at all. Specifically, the first three columns
show that a higher local initial unemployment rate is associated with an increased
likelihood of experiencing an unemployment spell before starting regular employment,
with longer unemployment, as well as an increased probability of experiencing long-
term unemployment even before starting one’s first regular employment spell. Finally,
the fourth column shows that workers entering during an economic downturn are also
more likely to start their labor market career through marginal (i.e. poorly paid)
employment.
Table 2.8: Search frictions
Dependent variable Unemployment before first regular job Low starting wage
Incidence Duration Longterm
Mean 0.306 42.649 0.018 0.025
Standard deviation 0.461 101.181 0.135 0.156
ur0 0.009??? 3.698??? 0.005??? 0.004???
(0.002) (0.379) (0.001) (0.001)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State of entry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of entry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of entrants Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 217,587 217,587 217,587 217,587
Adjusted R-Squared 0.305 0.316 0.083 0.012
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered on state at entry × year of
entry. Longterm unemployment before first regular job denotes unemployment of more than
one year. Low starting wage denotes that the entry wage is below 1.2 times the lower censoring
point (cf. footnote 8).
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2.4.2 The Importance of the Initial Employer for the Evolu-
tion of Wages
Given this pronounced effects of initial conditions on various quality measures of
workers’ first employer, we next focus on the importance of workers’ first employer
on the evolution of their starting as well as subsequent wages. To this end we simply
augment our baseline model, i.e. equation (2.2), with additional controls for a worker’s
first employer in a first step.
The first column of table 2.9 again replicates our baseline estimates, without any
controls for an individual’s initial employer. In contrast, the specification in the
second column shows estimates from a regression that includes fixed effects for a
worker’s initial employer and thus controls for all time-invariant employer character-
istics (whether observed or not).27 Estimates turn out to be markedly different from
those of our baseline specification. First, the estimated wage effect in the year of
entry is much smaller than in the baseline specification (-0.002 compared to -0.009)
and, moreover, the estimate is no longer statistically significant. Thus controlling
for workers’ initial employer seems to pick up not only all of the short-run but also
most of the long-run wage effect from poor entry conditions. Indeed, while the life-
time loss in wages amounts to about 1.3% in our baseline specification, controlling
for both observed and unobserved characteristics of first employer only yields an es-
timate of about 0.4%. Thus, similar to Oreopoulos et al. (2012), controlling for the
characteristics of workers’ first employer explains most of the observed wage effects.
To explore the remaining negative wage effect in the longer run in somewhat more
detail, we next split the sample by initial occupation (i.e. blue-collar versus white-
collar occupations).28 Columns 4 and 6 show results for blue-collar and white-collar
workers separately without controls for the initial employer, while columns 5 and 7
show results with these controls. This shows that there are remarkably distinct results
by initial occupation. Specifically, even though the initial wage effect is statistically
similar for blue and white-collar workers, the longer-run effect differs substantially
between the two groups. Specifically, because there is much less persistence in wage
losses from poor entry conditions, the long-run wage effects for white collar workers
are only about one-quarter the size of those for blue-collar workers (our estimates
imply an approximate loss in lifetime wages of only 0.3% for white-collar workers,
27We further include controls for time-varying characteristics of initial employers in column 3, but
these variables do not have much additional impact on the estimated wage effects on top of the fixed
effects for first employer.
28Note that these two groups do not exactly add up to the overall sample size because some
employment spells cannot be uniquely identified as either blue or white-collar (cf. table 2.1).
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Table 2.9: Controlling for workers’ first employer
Dependent variable ln(real daily wage)
Mean 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.241 4.241 4.367 4.367
Standard deviation 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.354 0.354 0.438 0.438
ur0 −0.009???−0.002 −0.002 −0.007??? 0.002 −0.010???−0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
exp · ur0 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.002??? 0.002???
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
exp2 · ur0 −0.000? −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000???−0.000??
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
exp3 · ur0 0.000? 0.000 0.000 0.000? 0.000 0.000?? 0.000?
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
εyur(0) −0.009???−0.002 −0.002 −0.007??? 0.002 −0.010???−0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
εyur(5) −0.009???−0.003? −0.002? −0.009???−0.001 −0.004?? 0.005???
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
εyur(10) −0.012???−0.004???−0.004???−0.013???−0.004???−0.002 0.008???
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
εyur(15) −0.014???−0.007???−0.006???−0.015???−0.006???−0.002 0.009???
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
εyur(20) −0.017???−0.008???−0.007???−0.016???−0.007??? 0.000 0.011???
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed-effects No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Time-varying firm controls No No Yes No Yes No Yes
BC0 only No No No Yes Yes No No
WC0 only No No No No No Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,349,075 1,797,908 563,764
Adjusted R-Squared 0.327 0.504 0.507 0.247 0.473 0.437 0.635
Lifetime loss 0.013 0.005 0.004 0.013 0.004 0.003 −0.007
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered on state at entry × year of
entry. The first column replicates the baseline estimates from column 6 of table 2.2.
compared to about 1.3% for blue-collar workers).29 This result may emphasize that
initial job and/or task assignment and occupation specific human capital are impor-
tant in explaining persistent wage effects especially because occupation specific human
capital is arguably more important for blue (e.g. craftsmen) than for white-collar jobs
(e.g. Sullivan, 2010). We provide additional evidence that appears to be consistent
and complementary with this explanation in the following section.
29This result is somewhat surprising because previous research has shown that white-collar workers
in Austria suffer from much larger and more persistent wage losses from job displacement (Schwerdt
et al., 2010). However, we use a totally different sample of workers than Schwerdt et al. (2010).
Moreover, our study focuses on low and medium-skilled labor market entrants who entered the
labor force between 1978 and 2000, while Schwerdt et al. (2010) focus on prime age workers of any
educational level who experienced a plant closure between 1982 and 1988.
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2.5 Job Mobility and Quality of Subsequent Em-
ployers
In the final part of the empirical analysis we focus on workers’ mobility behavior
and study how the quality of workers’ employer changes as their labor market career
proceeds, complementing the evidence from the preceding section. Table 2.10 looks
at workers’ mobility across jobs and, because some of this mobility may be frictional
(if it is caused, for example, by the bankruptcy of a worker’s current employer), we
also look at workers’ annual unemployment experience. As in section 2.4.2 above, we
separate the sample by initial occupation. Moreover, we exclude all observations with
zero years of labor market experience so that we can focus more clearly on workers’
labor market career following their first year of entry.
The first two columns of table 2.10 show that blue-collar workers are somewhat
more mobile, especially in the first years of their labor market career, if they entered
the labor market when local unemployment was high. This makes sense, as we would
expect workers to try to move to better employers as soon as possible if they had to
start their labor market career with a low-performance employer. At the same time,
however, columns 3 and 4 also show that these workers face a substantively increased
risk of experiencing an unemployment spell and, if they become unemployed, they
suffer from substantively longer spells of unemployment. Thus blue-collar workers
apparently suffer from a permanent increase in both the risk and duration of unem-
ployment. Part of this increase in the risk and duration of unemployment obviously
relates to the fact that blue-collar workers are more likely to start their labor market
career with an unsuccessful employer (cf. table 2.7), another part can be related to
corresponding persistent effects on the quality of subsequent employers, as shown and
discussed below.
We do not find any effect on job mobility for white-collar workers, as evident from
column 5 and 6 (i.e. none of the relevant point estimates is statistically different from
zero). We only find an increase in the duration of annual unemployment (without any
increase in the incidence of unemployment, however), but one that is considerably
smaller than the corresponding increase for blue-collar workers.
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Table 2.11 finally shows how the quality of workers’ subsequent employers changes
over time (as in table 2.10, observations with zero years of experience are excluded).
Not surprisingly, we find adjustment in compensation for both blue and white-collar
workers but, consistent with our previous results from section 2.4.2 above, adjustment
is apparently much slower and incomplete even after twenty years of experience for
blue-collar workers. Apparently, adjustment for white-collar workers occurs much
faster and appears to be complete ten years after first entry into the labor force at
the latest. Moreover, wage adjustment for white-collar workers apparently occurs
mainly within employers. Even more remarkably, we find that blue-collar workers are
persistently exposed to an increased risk of job displacement, which has consistently
been shown to be associated with substantive earnings losses (e.g. Jacobson et al.,
1993; Kletzer and Fairlie, 2003).
Table 2.11: Quality of Current Employer
Dependent variable Log Log Firm id Log Log Firm id
mean firm mean firm disappears mean firm mean firm disappears
wages earnings wth.1 year wages earnings wth.1 year
Mean 4.208 9.831 0.168 4.313 10.013 0.165
Standard deviation 0.288 0.459 0.374 0.296 0.422 0.371
ur0 −0.010??? −0.020??? 0.004??? −0.009??? −0.015??? −0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
exp · ur0 0.001??? 0.002??? −0.000 0.002??? 0.002??? 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
exp2 · ur0 −0.000?? −0.000??? 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
exp3 · ur0 0.000?? 0.000??? −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
εyur(1) −0.009??? −0.018??? 0.003??? −0.008??? −0.013??? 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
εyur(5) −0.006??? −0.012??? 0.003??? −0.003? −0.005?? 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
εyur(10) −0.005??? −0.009??? 0.003??? 0.001 −0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
εyur(15) −0.005??? −0.009??? 0.003??? 0.002 0.002 −0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
εyur(20) −0.004??? −0.009??? 0.003??? 0.003 0.002 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BC0 only Yes Yes Yes No No No
WC0 only No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 1,679,077 1,679,077 1,679,077 525,560 525,560 525,560
Adjusted R2 0.124 0.084 0.575 0.167 0.108 0.610
Lifetime loss 0.006 0.010 −0.003 0.000 0.002 −0.000
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered on state at entry×year of entry.
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Taken together, the fact that the adjustment in employer quality is incomplete
for blue-collar workers, notwithstanding the increase in job mobility in at least the
first five years of their labor market career, as well as the permanent increase in the
risk of job displacement suggests that a share of the blue-collar workers entering the
labor force in an economic downturn are forced into, and persistently locked in, low-
paying jobs and/or tasks. Moreover, occupation and/or task-specific human capital
may explain why these workers suffer permanent wages losses and why they are not
able to move on to better jobs or tasks later on in their career.
2.6 Conclusions
We estimate the long-run impact of initial labor market conditions on wages for young
males entering the Austrian labor market between 1978 and 2000. Consistent with
previous evidence, we find a substantial wage penalty from poor entry conditions
on starting wages. The estimated semi-elasticity of starting wages with respect to
the initial unemployment rate is on the order of -0.005 to -0.010, with our preferred
estimate equaling -0.009 (implying that a one percentage point increase in the initial
local unemployment rate is associated with 0.9% lower starting wages). Moreover, this
initial wage loss from first entry into the labor force during high local unemployment
turns out to be highly persistent. Consequently, we find sizable negative effects on
lifetime wages. Our preferred estimates imply that an increase in the initial local
unemployment rate by one percentage point is associated with an approximate loss in
lifetime wages of about 1.3%. Moreover, our estimates are close to the results reported
in Stevens (2007) for Germany and Kwon et al. (2010) for Sweden. Our finding of
persistent wage effects from poor entry conditions is also in line with Fru¨hwirth-
Schnatter et al. (2011) who study labor earnings dynamics in Austria using the same
data source as we do, but a completely different empirical approach.
We further show that there is considerable cyclical variation in the quality of
a worker’s first regular employment. Even though workers are positively selected in
times of high unemployment, they often end up working with employers that generally
pay lower wages. We also show that initial job and/or task assignment within jobs
is very important in explaining both the short and long-run wage effects from entry
into the labor force during poor local entry conditions. In fact, controlling for the
characteristics of workers’ first employers can explain as much as three-quarters of the
observed long-run wage effects resulting from poor entry conditions.
We finally find some very distinct patterns for blue and white-collar workers. The
negative wage effects fade away for white-collar workers after about five to ten years,
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while blue-collar workers suffer from very persistent negative wage effects from poor
labor market entry conditions. At least part of this difference appears to be related to
corresponding differences in the speed of quality adjustment of subsequent employers
between occupations, where only blue-collar workers are permanently downgraded to
lower quality employers.
2.A Appendix
Sample Construction
We first determine the start of the first regular employment spell for each male indi-
vidual born between 1958 and 1985.30 The restriction with respect to year of birth, in
combination with the restriction on age at beginning of one’s first regular job that we
apply below, ensures that the potential range of age at first entry into the labor force is
the same for each entry cohort considered in the analysis (1978–2000). Additionally,
we drop all individuals who were self-employed and/or worked as a farmer or civil
servant at least once, because the data do not consistently cover these employment
spells over the whole period of analysis and/or because earnings are not recorded (in
the case of self-employment). We thus cannot fully observe the employment and/or
earnings histories of such individuals.
We then determine each individual’s age at the start of his first regular employ-
ment spell starting between 1978 and 2000. We define regular employment as an
employment spell which lasts for at least 180 days.31 We also focus on individuals
aged between 16 and 21 years at the start of their first regular employment spell.
This leaves us with 797,846 unique individuals (see table A.1), from which we take a
simple 30% random sample. This finally yields a total of 217,587 unique individuals
and 3,349,075 observations (= individuals × years) when following these individuals
over time.
Table A.1 shows descriptive statistics for some key variables, by individuals’ age
at the time of first entry into the labor force. We consistently exclude individuals who
start their first regular employment after they attain age 30 because they presumably
never enter the labor force at all.32 The first column of table A.1 shows descriptives
30Obviously, an individual must be covered by the ASSD in order to be included in the sample. An
individual is covered by the ASSD if he or she is entitled to future social security benefits (typically
old-age benefits) or has already claimed social security benefits before first entering the labor force.
Typically individuals “enter” the ASSD once they start working.
31Importantly, vocational training such as apprenticeship training is not considered as regular
employment (but as formal training).
32The group of individuals who enter at a later age probably consists of two very different groups,
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Table A.1: Sample selection
Age at start of first regular employment
16-30 16-21 22-30
Real daily wage 50.488 (18.644) 47.536 (15.303) 56.742 (23.027)
Age at start of first job 20.863 (2.948) 19.200 (1.004) 24.386 (2.589)
Duration of first regular job 2.800 (3.995) 2.692 (4.035) 3.030 (3.900)
Blue-collar 0.650 (0.477) 0.726 (0.446) 0.487 (0.500)
White-collar 0.348 (0.476) 0.271 (0.445) 0.510 (0.500)
Below GfGr: Yes = 1 0.059 (0.235) 0.050 (0.219) 0.077 (0.266)
Above HBGr: Yes = 1 0.049 (0.215) 0.019 (0.135) 0.112 (0.315)
Region of employer:
Vienna 0.239 (0.426) 0.198 (0.398) 0.326 (0.469)
Lower Austria 0.158 (0.365) 0.171 (0.377) 0.129 (0.336)
Burgenland 0.024 (0.152) 0.000 (0.000) 0.021 (0.142)
Upper Austria 0.168 (0.374) 0.183 (0.387) 0.137 (0.344)
Styria 0.139 (0.346) 0.145 (0.352) 0.129 (0.335)
Carinthia 0.065 (0.246) 0.066 (0.249) 0.062 (0.241)
Salzburg 0.070 (0.255) 0.071 (0.257) 0.067 (0.249)
Tyrol 0.090 (0.286) 0.091 (0.288) 0.087 (0.282)
Vorarlberg 0.000 (0.000) 0.049 (0.217) 0.000 (0.000)
Industry of employer:
Agriculture 0.015 (0.120) 0.012 (0.108) 0.021 (0.142)
Electricity 0.007 (0.085) 0.009 (0.095) 0.003 (0.057)
Mining 0.006 (0.078) 0.007 (0.082) 0.005 (0.068)
Manufacturing 0.344 (0.475) 0.401 (0.490) 0.225 (0.417)
Construction 0.165 (0.371) 0.190 (0.392) 0.114 (0.318)
Wholesale and retail trade 0.150 (0.357) 0.159 (0.366) 0.130 (0.336)
Gastronomy, hotel business 0.060 (0.237) 0.046 (0.209) 0.089 (0.285)
Transportation 0.059 (0.236) 0.060 (0.238) 0.057 (0.233)
Finance 0.082 (0.274) 0.058 (0.235) 0.130 (0.337)
Cleaning, body care 0.009 (0.096) 0.008 (0.089) 0.012 (0.109)
Arts, entertainment, sports 0.010 (0.102) 0.005 (0.072) 0.021 (0.145)
Healthcare, welfare 0.014 (0.116) 0.006 (0.079) 0.029 (0.167)
Education, research 0.015 (0.121) 0.000 (0.000) 0.037 (0.189)
Lobbies, social sec. agencies 0.063 (0.243) 0.033 (0.180) 0.125 (0.331)
Housekeeping 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.022) 0.000 (0.000)
Number of observations 1,174,523 797,846 376,677
Notes: Table entries are sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Daily wages are
given in Euros. Real wage are deflated using the consumer price index with base year 2007. GfGr
(“Gerinfu¨gigkeitsgrenze”) and HBGr (“Ho¨chstbemessungsgrundlage”) denote the upper and the
lower censoring point with respect to earnings, respectively. “Below GfGr” is an indicator taking
on the value 1 if the nominal daily wage is equal to or below 1.2 times the lower censoring point
and 0 otherwise. “Above HBGr” is an indicator taking on the value 1 if the nominal daily wage
is equal to or above 0.8 times the upper censoring point and 0 otherwise.
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for all individuals, the second (third) column shows descriptives for individuals aged
16 to 21 (aged 22 to 30) when starting their first employment. A comparison of the
second to the third column shows that our sample restriction with respect to age at
the start of first regular employment works as expected. The sample of lower skilled
workers, compared to the group of higher skilled workers, contains a higher fraction
of blue-collar workers, has considerably lower wages on average, and shorter duration
of the first regular employment spell.
Also note that, for the group of individuals aged between 22 and 30 when first en-
tering the labor force, highly skilled workers potentially are mixed up with low-skilled
workers: individuals in this group of workers either spent much time in education,
were previously unemployed, or had short employment spells not counting as regular
employment. This is apparent from the proportion of workers below the lower cen-
soring point or above the higher censoring point. The probability of crossing any of
the two points is higher for the sample of older workers. Consequently, the variation
in the real daily wage (and thus productivity) is considerably smaller in the sample
of younger workers than in the group of older workers.
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who are indistinguishable from each other in the data. On the one hand there are truly high-skilled
workers who enter the labor market at a later stage because they continued their education until that
time. On the other hand, however, there are also low-skilled workers who were never employed or
only sporadically employed before starting their first regular employment. Because schooling is not
directly observed, we would mix these two groups of workers together if we were to include them.
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CHAPTER 3
Announcement Effects of Health Policy Reforms: Evidence from
the Abolition of Austria’s Baby Bonus
Joint with Andreas Kuhn
A revised version of this chapter is accepted for publication in the European Journal
of Health Economics. An earlier version has been published in 2011 as IZA Discus-
sion Paper, No. 6141; ECON Working Paper, No. 48; NRN Working Paper, No. 1116.
“Economics is, at root, the study of incentives.”
Steven D. Levitt, American economist
3.1 Introduction
Forward looking behavior of individuals has potentially important implications for the
implementation, as well as for the evaluation, of health policy reforms (and beyond).
Indeed, if individuals are forward looking and if policy reforms are publicly announced
in advance, individuals are likely to adapt their behavior even before the effective
implementation of any given policy reform. As Malani and Reif (2010, p.2) put it,
“anticipation is a reasonable diagnosis if individuals are forward looking, have access to
information on future treatment, and there is a benefit to acting before the treatment
is adopted”. Clearly, policy makers need to be aware of potential announcement
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effects resulting from anticipatory behavior whenever they are planning to implement
major health policy reforms and to announce them beforehand. It is also evident that
anticipatory behavior should be factored in when evaluating specific health policy
reforms. In fact, ignoring announcement effects may lead to misleading conclusions
regarding the impact of the policy reform under study (Blundell et al., 2011; Malani
and Reif, 2010). Moreover, we may be especially concerned about potential negative
health effects if individuals anticipate even small changes in financial incentives but are
unable to foresee all potential health effects resulting from specific behavioral changes.
We believe that such a situation is especially common in health policy contexts where
it is very difficult, even for experts, to plausibly assess all potential health effects
resulting from any given change in health-related behavior.
Some of the most compelling empirical evidence on announcement effects of health
policy reforms available comes from the recent experience of introducing baby bonuses
in Australia and Germany, respectively. Indeed, a couple of recent empirical studies
has convincingly shown that the introduction of such policy measures is usually asso-
ciated with considerable behavioral responses in the short-run, potentially resulting
in negative health effects for the mother and/or her newborn child.1 In the case of
Australia, the government publicly announced on May 11, 2004, that it would pay
3000$ (about 2190e) to each family of a newborn child born on or after July 1, 2004.2
The introduction of the bonus was thus announced in advance of the effective policy
change, creating an incentive to delay births. In their empirical evaluation of the pol-
icy change, Gans and Leigh (2009) find that 6% of the births (more than 1000 births)
expected to happen in the 28 days preceding the actual policy change were moved to
July 1st 2004 or later to become eligible for the baby bonus.3 They find that most of
the effect is due to a corresponding timing of induction and cesarean section proce-
dures. Consequently, they also find that children who were moved into the eligibility
period were more likely to be of high birth weight.4 Tamm (2009) analyzes a similar
1Substantial effects on birth timing are also found by Dickert-Conlin and Chandra (1999) and
Chen (2011) who study the effects of tax incentives on the timing of births in the U.S. and France,
respectively. Other studies have found that taxes distort other types of individual behavior such as
marriages (Alm and Whittington, 1995) or even deaths (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2003).
2More precisely, the baby bonus replaced another policy previously in force. In the previous
system, the bonus was dependent on the income of the primary caregiver in the year the child was
born and was in the form of a refundable tax offset. Most, though not all, households had an incentive
to move births to July 1, 2004, or later. See Gans and Leigh (2009) for details.
3Drago et al. (2011) also analyze the introduction of the birth benefit in Australia, but use
a different data source. They find that the birth benefit had both a positive effect on women’s
fertility intentions and one of modest size on the effective birthrate. Positive fertility effects from the
Australian policy change are also reported in Lain et al. (2009).
4This in turn may imply long-run effects of short-run behavioral responses, since birth weight is
suspected to be causally related with later labor-market outcomes (e.g. Black et al., 2007).
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reform in the system of family benefits in Germany, the introduction of parental leave
benefits (“Elterngeld”) as of January 1, 2007.5 As in Australia, the announcement
happened only a few weeks in advance, meaning that the policy change could only
affect the timing, but not the number of births. Similarly to Gans and Leigh (2009),
Tamm finds that a substantial number of births were delayed and moved into the
eligibility period for the new benefit system. Specifically, he concludes that almost
8% of births (around 1000 births) that could have been expected in the last week of
December were shifted to the first week of January 2007. He also finds a slight increase
in birth weight among the births most likely to have been shifted (i.e. January versus
December births).
In this chapter we study the fertility effects, as well as the potential health con-
sequences for both mother and newborn child, following the announcement of the
abolition of the Austrian baby bonus as of January 1, 1997. The Austrian baby
bonus amounted to a maximum of 1090e per child in 1996, the year before the aboli-
tion, and was paid conditional on medical examinations of both mother and newborn
child. The unique feature of this policy change is that the elimination of the benefit
was announced about ten months prior to enactment, creating the potential for an
announcement effect because prospective parents had both an incentive and the op-
portunity to move their baby plans forward. Although the response window in order
to qualify for the birth benefit before its abolition was only limited to three weeks,
the early announcement could have increased the number of babies born in the month
prior to the policy change. On top of this, pregnant women with a due date close to
the date of the policy change might have manipulated the exact day of birth by means
of a medical intervention (i.e. cesarean section). In the second part of the analysis we
will explore whether the early announcement of the policy reform had any negative
health effects for mothers and/or her newborn children.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we provide
some background information on the baby bonus in Austria. This is followed by a
short discussion of the data source and some descriptives in section 3.3. We present
our estimates of the fertility response following the announcement of the abolition of
the baby bonus in section 3.4. Section 3.5 examines whether mothers (un)consciously
take increased health risks for themselves and/or their babies when rescheduling the
5As in the case of Australia, the German policy changed incentives differently for households
with different characteristics. Generally, households with women working before giving birth, those
planning to work shortly following birth, or those with high income received higher benefits after
the reform and thus had an incentive to delay their births. See Tamm (2009) for details. Neugart
and Ohlsson (2011) provide an alternative evaluation of the German parental benefit reform (with
similar conclusions).
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timing of conception or birth. Section 4.6 concludes.
3.2 The Austrian Baby Bonus
3.2.1 Institutional Background
The Austrian baby bonus (“Geburtenbeihilfe”) was first introduced on January 1,
1968, as an untaxed single payment per live birth. In 1975 the payment of the bonus
was made conditional on medical examinations both during pregnancy and after child-
birth, and the payment of the bonus was consequently partitioned. After the last
expansion of the birth benefit in January 1987, the maximum benefit amounted to
1090e per child and was paid in five consecutive rates. The first rate of the bonus was
paid immediately after birth (145.3e), the second rate one week after birth (218e),
and the remaining three rates were paid after the child’s first (363.4e), second (218e),
and fourth (145.3e) birthday.
Policy makers wanted to sustain the incentive for mothers to continue with medical
examinations for themselves and their newborn children even after the abolition of
the baby bonus; they thus introduced an alternative incentive, the so-called “Mutter-
Kind-Pass”, which is still in place today. It consists of a single bonus of 145e per
birth; the payment is conditional on both mother and child undergoing specific medical
examinations, and it is paid on the child’s first birthday. Furthermore, eligibility to
the new bonus is confined to mothers who are the child’s primary caregiver and to
households whose income does not exceed a given threshold in the year of birth.6 Thus,
depending on household income, the abolition of the birth benefit meant a cut in cash
benefits amounting to either 945e or 1090e (equivalent to a cut in benefits of 87%
or 100%, respectively). For a full-time employee (not household) with median labor
earnings in 1996 equal to 20,991e, the full amount of the baby bonus was worth
approximately 4.5% of his or her annual earnings (equivalent to about 2.3 weeks’
income).
Compared to other family benefits, the baby bonus was rather modest in size.
Aside from the birth benefit, three basic other types of family benefits existed (and
still exist today). The most important (i.e. substantial) benefit is the family benefit
(“Familienbeihilfe”), which is paid until the child’s 18th birthday at the minimum. In
1997 it amounted to 95-134e per month, depending on the child’s age. Parental leave
6Specifically, the maximum household income in order to qualify for the “Mutter-Kind-Pass”
bonus is defined as 11·HBGr, with HBGr (“Ho¨chstbemessungsgrundlage”) denoting the upper income
threshold above which the maximum pension benefit accrues. The threshold varies over time and
amounted to 2965e in 1997. Thus annual household income had to be lower than 32,616e in 1997
to qualify for the “Mutter-Kind-Pass”.
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benefits were paid over a period of 1.5 years at that time, and amounted to 340e per
month. However, until another major reform in 2002, these benefits were tied to the
mother’s employment before giving birth. Finally, there is a monthly tax allowance
for children who live in the same household as the parent filing the tax report. The tax
allowance amounted to 25-51e per month in 1997, depending on the child’s parity.
Taken together, the baby bonus accounted for roughly 9% of all benefits (excluding
tax allowances) accruing within the first four years of a child’s life.7
3.2.2 The Abolition of the Baby Bonus
The structural deficit of the federal budget was the ultimate reason for the abolition of
the baby bonus. Generous social benefits combined with a deterioration of the labor
market caused the ratio of social expenditure to GDP to skyrocket in the early 1990s.
In spite of a temporary strengthening of the economy in 1994, social expenditures
still rose, resulting in an overall increase of 36.5% between 1991 to 1996 (Bauern-
berger and Guger, 1998). To decelerate rising social spending, the governing coalition
between the conservatives and the social democrats finally passed an encompassing
austerity package (“Strukturanpassungsgesetz”) on July 1, 1996. Savings in family
policy should be achieved by reducing maternity leave duration by half a year (from
24 to 18 months) and by abolishing the baby bonus. In terms of our identification
strategy, it is important to stress that, except for the birth benefit, all reforms decided
on within the framework of the austerity program came into effect on July 1, 1996 –
half a year before the abolition of the baby bonus.
Our review of newspapers suggests that the abolition must have been known
by February 2, 1996, when the coalition between the conservatives and the social
democrats first announced their agreement on the austerity package. There was ex-
tensive press coverage, but there was also confusion about the exact date of abolition,
and the media initially discussed July 1, 1996 as the effective date of elimination.
By the first week of March, however, shortly before the coalition’s agreement on the
structural adjustment law was signed (March 11, 1996), it must have been evident
that the birth benefit would be canceled for all children born on January 1, 1997 or
later.
3.2.3 The Window of Opportunity
From what we have said above, it follows that there was a time gap of nearly ten
months between the definitive announcement and the effective date of the policy
7Neglecting tax deductibles, [1090e/(4·12·94.5e+1.5·12·338.6e+1090e)]' 0.093.
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change. Because the abolition of the baby bonus implies an increase in the price of a
further child, prospective parents had a financial incentive to move their baby plans
forward. From the time of the announcement of the elimination of the birth benefit,
the time window during which a baby would have to be conceived in order to still get
the birth benefit was very short, however.
In fact, we can be quite precise regarding the length of this time window because
the duration of gestation is recorded in the birth statistics (more details are given
in section 3.3 below). In the time period considered (i.e. the period from July 1990
until December 2006), the length of a pregnancy shows an approximately normal
distribution, with a mean duration of 276 days and a standard deviation of about 14
days. The abolition of the bonus was definitely announced on March 7, 1996. After
a mean pregnancy duration of 276 days, birth would take place on December 8 at
the earliest. The potential response time for women with average pregnancy duration
therefore lasts 23 days (i.e. December 31 - December 8) – a little bit more than three
weeks. The corresponding 90% confidence interval ranges from 266 days to 287 days,
implying that approximately 90% (10%) of all conceptions from March 19 (April 9)
can be expected to be born before January 1, 1997.8 These simple calculations make
it clear that the window of opportunity was short, and that prospective parents thus
had to respond quite immediately if they wanted to still be eligible for the bonus after
the abolition had been made public.
3.3 Data and Descriptives
3.3.1 Data Source
Our empirical analysis relies on individual birth records from the Austrian birth statis-
tics (“Geburtenstatistik”), covering all births from 1971 until 2006. In addition to
information on year and month of birth, the data also contain some information on
parental characteristics (such as age, education, marital status, labor market sta-
tus, religion, and nationality) and, beginning in 1984, some health measures for the
newborn child (such as weight, length, and Apgar score9). Moreover, information re-
8Note that it is possible that some couples already tried to conceive after February 2, 1996, even
though there was confusion about the exact date of abolition until March 7, 1996. It is therefore still
possible to find an increase in births before December 1996. See also footnote 12.
9The Apgar score is used to assess the health of a newborn immediately after birth. In our data,
the Apgar score one, five, and ten minutes after birth is recorded. The Apgar score assesses five
different categories (heart rate, breathing, muscle tone, reflex response, and skin color) with a score
between zero and two each, where the scores are simply added up. Low values on the score are
indicative of poor health. In the regression reported in section 3.5.2 below, we use the average of a
child’s score 1, 5, and 10 minutes after birth.
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garding the implemented birth procedure is recorded in the data from 1995 onwards.
3.3.2 Sample Period(s)
Our baseline sample period basically covers the period from July 1990 until December
2006. We start the sample period in July 1990 because another major family policy
reform took effect on that specific date (the reform basically involved a massive exten-
sion of the duration of parental leave benefits).10 The sample period is considerably
shorter, however, when we focus either on newborn’s health or on birth procedure due
to data availability.
As we will show below, however, the exact length of the sample period does not
appear to have any substantial impact on our results. In fact, our estimates of the
policy impact turn out to be robust across a wide range of alternative sample periods
(as will be shown in section 4.5.2 below).
3.3.3 The Monthly Birth Count, 1990–2006
Figure 3.1 shows both the observed and the de-trended absolute number of monthly
births from January 1990 to December 2006.
Panel (a) shows the absolute number of monthly births, with dots (triangles)
indicating the number of births in December (January) in any given year. Two specific
features stand out clearly. First, there is a strong non-linear trend in the number of
births, with a pronounced hump shape in the 1990s (presumably reflecting the large
immigrant influx from the Balkan countries at that time) and a flattening afterwards.
The number of monthly births increased from about 7500 births per month in the
early 1990s to a high of somewhat more than 8000 births per month in the mid
1990s. The number of births began to decrease again at the end of the 1990s, when
the number of births seems to have stabilized at about 6500 births per month. The
second outstanding feature is the existence of a pronounced cyclical pattern within any
given year. Within each year, many more children are born in the middle rather than
at the end of the year.11 Even more striking is the fact that the number of children
10It is worth mentioning that our basic sample period covers, besides the austerity package and
the abolition of the baby bonus, two other major policy changes in family law that were made
public in August 2001. First, parental leave duration was extended from 18 to 30 months for all
mothers who were on maternity leave during August 2001, gave birth after July 2000, and earned
no more than 14,600e per year. A second reform was enacted in January 2002 and decoupled
eligibility to maternity leave benefits from any prior work requirement, thus extending eligibility
to self-employed women and mothers not in the labor force. We control for these policy changes
by including appropriately defined indicator variables in the regressions that are based on sample
periods covering these policies.
11There are basically two explanations for the seasonal pattern in birth timing. First, there are
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born in December over the whole period considered never exceeds the number of births
in January – except in December 1996, the month just before the birth benefit was
effectively abolished.
Figure 3.1: Actual and De-trended Number of Monthly Births
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(a) Observed absolute number of monthly births
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(b) De-trended number of monthly births
Notes: Panel (a) shows the observed number of monthly births. The dotted line shows the actual
number of monthly births, the solid line displays the three-month moving average. Panel (b) shows
the de-trended number of monthly births (de-trending is done using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with
default smoothing parameter). The solid line represents the two-month moving average. The dots
(triangles) indicate the actual or de-trended number of births in December (January) of each year.
seasonal fluctuations in marriages which may lead to fluctuations in births. In fact, marriage season-
ality in Austria matches the seasonal pattern in births if newlywed couples immediately stop using
contraceptives with the intent of conceiving. A second explanation are parental preferences regarding
the month of birth (Rodgers and Udry, 1988). See also Buckles and Hungerman (2008) for a detailed
discussion of both causes and consequences of seasonality in births.
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We remove the time trend from the data in panel (b) and thus make the monthly
cyclicality in births more evident. In each year, the number of births is lowest at the
end of the year and highest in the middle. The year 1996 clearly stands out regarding
the number of children, especially those born in December. In fact, the de-trended
number of births in December 1996 (463) corresponds to the 95th percentile of the
distribution of de-trended number of births over the entire period and to the 1st
percentile of the distribution of the de-trended number of births in December.
3.4 The Fertility Response
3.4.1 Estimating the Fertility Response
A couple of issues have to be considered when estimating the fertility response fol-
lowing the announcement of the abolition of the baby bonus. First note that we have
to rely on the longitudinal patterns in the number of births to estimate the policy
impact on the birth count. Because there is no control group available, the outcome
in the absence of the policy change needs to be predicted using regularities in the data
before and/or after the policy change. Another issue is that there may be a permanent
effect from the abolition of the baby bonus on fertility behavior. This implies that
we should be cautious when using, or potentially try to do without, data from after
the baby bonus has been abolished (i.e. data after December 1996). Second, figure
3.1 suggests that we should try to model a flexible time trend in the number of births
when using a longer sample period. However, it turns out that fitting a flexible time
trend becomes somewhat difficult when only using data from before the policy change
because observations at the boundary of the sample period have a strong impact on
the estimated time trend in case of a nonlinear trend (and thus on the estimate of the
fertility response as well). We use two distinct empirical strategies to cope with these
issues in the following.
Our first empirical strategy only uses data from before the policy change until (and
including) October 1996, but refrains from fitting a flexible time trend.12 At the same
time, we want to focus on a time period within an approximately linear time trend
12November 1996 births are excluded as well because, according to the distribution of the pregnancy
duration, about 5% of responding mothers who conceived immediately after announcement delivered
before November 28, 1996. This follows from the 90% confidence interval that ranges from 266 to
287 days of pregnancy. More importantly, it turns out that the initial confusion about the exact date
of the abolition was less pronounced than our reading of the newspapers suggested (see section 3.2.2
again) and that many prospective parents must have known the date of the abolition already before
the first week of March. Indeed, we already find a substantial, and statistically significant number of
additional births in November 1996 (results not shown). This implies that our main estimates based
on births in December 1996 unambiguously represent a lower bound on the overall fertility effect.
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in the number of births. A simple visual inspection of the observed number of births,
as in figure 3.1, suggests that there is a linear time trend in the monthly number of
births from about 1992 onwards. We thus regress the absolute (or, alternatively, the
log) number of births on a linear time trend and a series of dummies for calendar
month, denoted by γm, on a sample period of varying length
bt = α + βt+ γm + εt, (3.1)
with t ∈ {T, T + 1, . . . , 1996.9, 1996.10}. We let T be equal to either 1992.11, 1993.11,
or 1994.11. Thus the sample period consists of either 48, 36, or 24 months (in section
4.5.2, we show that our results are also robust to alternative sample periods).
In the second strategy, we use observations from both before and after the policy
change, implicitly assuming that only those parents move birth forward who originally
wanted to give birth in the time period that we omit from the sample period. Using
observations from after the policy change as well makes it possible to use a much more
flexible form for the time trend in the number of births
bt = α + βκ(t) + γm + δI(t ≥ 1997.1) + εt, (3.2)
with t ∈ {1990.7, 1990, 8, . . . , 1996.9, 1996.10, T, T + 1, . . . , 2006.11, 2006.12}. That is,
t runs from July 1990 to December 2006 in this case, but we leave out a period of
varying length in the middle of the sample period, running from 1996.11 to T . We let
T equal either 1997.1, 1998.1 or 1999.1, and thus the period that is left out from the
analysis correspond to either 2, 14, or 26 months. In this second scenario we allow
for a flexible time trend in the number of births, using a fourth-order polynomial in
t, denoted by κ(t). We also allow for the possibility of any permanent effect of the
abolition of the bonus on the number of births by including a dummy variable that
takes on the value of 1 if t is equal to or greater than 1997.1. Thus δ will capture any
permanent fertility effect of the abolition of the bonus.13
For either strategy, we then use the estimates from the above regressions in a
second step to make an out-of-sample prediction of the number of babies that would
have been born in December 1996 in the absence of the policy change, denoted by
b̂1996.12. The difference between the observed and the predicted number of births in
December 1996,
b1996.12 − b̂1996.12, (3.3)
13Similarly, we also include additional dummies for the other major policy changes that were
implemented during the sample period (see footnote 10 for details).
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is our estimate of the impact of the announcement of the abolition of the baby bonus
on the number of children born, relative to the number of children we would have
expected in the absence of the policy change, or early announcement, alternatively.
Table 3.1: Fertility Responsiveness
Panel A: Observations from before the abolition only, linear time trend
Sample period 1994.11-1996.10 1993.11-1996.10 1992.11-1996.10
Number of births
Residual Dec 1996 486.625??? 562.583??? 591.333???
(46.648) (109.883) (114.649)
Number of births Dec 1996 7613 7613 7613
Number of observations 24 36 48
Adjusted R-Squared 0.739 0.718 0.838
p-value (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log number of births
Residual Dec 1996 0.066??? 0.075??? 0.078???
(0.006) (0.014) (0.014)
Number of log births Dec 1996 8.938 8.937 8.938
Number of observations 24 36 48
Adjusted R-Squared 0.732 0.715 0.839
p-value (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Observations from before and after the abolition, nonlinear time trend
Sample period 1990.7-1996.10 1990.7-1996.10 1990.7-1996.10
&1997.1-2006.12 &1998.1-2006.12 &1999.1-2006.12
Number of births
Residual Dec 1996 698.290??? 678.489??? 663.846???
(129.264) (124.48) (123.07)
Number of births Dec 1996 7613 7613 7613
Number of observations 196 184 172
Adjusted R-Squared 0.956 0.960 0.962
p-value (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log number of births
Residual Dec 1996 0.097??? 0.094??? 0.091???
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Number of log births Dec 1996 8.938 8.937 8.938
Number of observations 196 184 172
Adjusted R-Squared 0.952 0.957 0.960
p-value (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: ?, ??, and ??? denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. In
Panel A, the time trend is assumed to be linear and the underlying sample period varies between
two (column 2) and four (column 4) years prior to the policy change. In Panel B, the time trend is
assumed to follow a fourth-order polynomial, and a dummy variable for each major policy change
is included (1997.1, 2000.7, 2002.1). The underlying sample period covers observations from 1990.7
to 2006.12, but leaves out a period in between which is potentially affected by the policy change.
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Table 3.1 shows results for both the absolute number of births and the log number
of births and for the two different strategies outlined above.14 Panel A shows the
resulting estimates when using data from before the policy only, but for three different
sample periods, combined with a simple linear time trend in each case. Depending
on the length of the sample period, estimates of the additional number of births in
December 1996 range from 487 to 592 births. In all three cases, the estimate of the
extra births turns out to be statistically significant. In relative terms, the estimates
imply that about 6.8% (= 100% · [487/(7613− 487)]) to 8.4% (= 100% · [592/(7613−
592)]) additional children were born due to the announced abolition of the bonus. We
get very similar estimates when using the log number of births as dependent variable,
as shown in the lower part of panel A. Relative effects in this case range from about
6.8% (= 100% · [exp(0.066)− 1]) to 8.1% (= 100% · [exp(0.078)− 1]).
It turns out that our alternative strategy yields very similar estimates, as shown in
panel B. Depending on the sample period, estimates range from a low of 664 (9.5%) to
a high of 698 (10.1%) extra births in December 1996. Using data from after the policy
change as well thus yields somewhat larger estimates than those we obtain when we
only use data from before the policy change, but the point estimates based on the two
strategies are in fact not statistically different from each other. Again, using the log
number of births yields very similar quantitative implications.
3.4.2 Robustness
We first test the sensitivity of our baseline results with respect to (additional) varia-
tions in the sample period. Remember that when only using observations from before
the abolition of the bonus, our baseline model uses either 24, 36, or 48 months prior
to the policy change in order to predict the December 1996 birth count. Panel A of
table 4.8 shows the resulting minimum and maximum estimate of the fertility response
when we vary the length of the observation period, in steps of one month, from 24 to
48 months. Estimates turn out to be robust to this variation in the sample period.
The resulting minimum (maximum) estimate equals 417 (622) births, an estimate well
within the range of our baseline estimates. The same conclusion applies to the range
of estimates when using the log number of births as dependent variable.
When using observations from both before and after the policy change, our base-
line result basically relies on the whole observation period from July 1990 to December
1996, but excludes a period in between of varying length. In contrast to the baseline
14We also re-ran our baseline regressions using the total fertility rate as dependent variable. Results
turn out to be qualitatively similar.
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specification, panel B of table 4.8 holds the omitted period fix (1997.1–1999.1), but
varies the length of the sample period before and after, from a minimum of 24 months
to a maximum of 76 months (both before and after the omitted period). Again, es-
timates turn out to be surprisingly robust across the various sample periods. The
minimum (maximum) estimate among all estimates is equal to 309 (684) additional
births in December 1996. As above, we find a quantitatively similar pattern of es-
timates when modeling the log number of births instead of the absolute number of
births.
Table 3.2: Robustness
Dependent variable Number of births log(Nr of births)
Min Max Min Max
Panel A: Observations from before the abolition only, linear time trend
Residual December 1996 416.800??? 622.250??? 0.056??? 0.082???
(65.384) (114.179) (0.008) (0.015)
Number of (log) births Dec 1996 7613 7613 8.937 8.937
Number of observations 25 40 25 40
Adjusted R-Squared 0.667 0.814 0.661 0.812
p-value (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Observations from both before and after the abolition, nonlinear time trend
Residual December 1996 308.955??? 683.588??? 0.041??? 0.095???
(102.14) (140.048) (0.015) (0.019)
Number of (log) births Dec 1996 7613 7613 8.937 8.937
Number of observations 61 81 61 65
Adjusted R-Squared 0.941 0.909 0.937 0.863
p-value (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel C: Placebo regressions, de-trended number of births
True policy change Placebo regressions
Y :1996 Y :1995 Y :1994 Y :1993
Residual December Year Y 455.025??? −182.784 72.090 68.241
(143.074) (150.167) (135.771) (145.206)
Number of births Dec Y 7613 7232 7605 7672
Number of observations 48 48 48 48
Adjusted R-Squared 0.648 0.669 0.732 0.741
p-value (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: ?, ??, and ??? denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Panel
A uses a linear time trend with a sample period that varies between two and four years prior to
the policy change. The model in panel B assumes a time trend that follows the fourth polynomial.
The sample period varies between 24 and 76 months before and after the policy change, while the
omitted period in between is held fix (1997.1–1999.1). Panel C shows results from several placebo
regressions based on the de-trended series of monthly births. See main text for details.
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As an additional robustness check, we apply an alternative two-step procedure. In
a first step, we de-trend the whole time series using a conventional Hodrick-Prescott
filter. We then regress the de-trended number of births on a series of monthly dummies
in the second step.15 As in the baseline model, we use the four foregoing years to
predict the de-trended number of births in December 1996. Moreover, this exercise
is not only done for the real policy change but also for hypothetical policy changes
in December 1993, 1994 and 1995. Panel C of table 4.8 presents the results. The
first column shows that the impact of the abolition is estimated to amount to 455
additional births. This estimate is slightly smaller than the estimate obtained by
the baseline model, but it is well within the estimated range of estimates from panel
A above (i.e. the estimates are not significantly different from each other).16 The
results presented in the subsequent columns show estimates of the residual number of
births in the hypothetical scenario that the policy change happened one, two or three
years earlier than it actually did. It is immediately evident that none of the placebo
regressions yields a residual that is statistically different from zero, underlining our
argument that the announced abolition of the baby bonus increased fertility in the
short-run.
3.4.3 Conception (Re-)Scheduling vs. Timing of Births
Thus far we have ignored the fact that we expect to see extra births in December
1996 for two very distinct reasons. First, as we have discussed above, there was a
short window of opportunity of about three weeks during which prospective mothers
could try to get pregnant in order to give birth before January 1, 1997 and still get
the birth benefit. A second reason, however, may be that women with a due date
close the date of abolition could have manipulated the exact day of birth by means of
a surgical intervention (i.e. cesarean section). We now try to gain some insight into
the effective source of the additional births that we observe in December 1996. To
distinguish between the two channels, we now focus on the date of conception, which
can easily be derived from the available information on the duration of pregnancy and
the date of birth. Note that, because the abolition of the birth benefit was announced
after the first week of March, the three week response window falls entirely into the
month of March. Hence the comparison of the impact on the number of conceptions
15Specifically, we run the following regression: b¨t = α + γm + εt, where b¨t denotes the de-trended
number of monthly births and γm denotes the inclusion of a full set of monthly dummies.
16It is actually quite intuitive that the estimate based on the de-trended number of births is smaller
because the filter fits the time trend using all observations – including the extra births in December
1996. As a consequence, the time trend is biased upward around the date of the true policy change.
This in turn results in a downward biased estimate for the fertility response in December 1996.
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in March with the impact on the number of births in December 1996 is insightful in
terms of whether conception (re-)scheduling or birth timing is the primary cause of
the extra births in December 1996. Analogous to the baseline model, we use data
from the preceding 48 months to make a simple prediction of the number of babies
that would have been conceived in March 1996 in the absence of the policy change.
Table 3.3: Conception (Re-)Scheduling vs. Birth Timing
Dependent variable Nr of conceptions Log nr of conceptions
Residual March 1996 631.041??? 0.083???
(135.143) (0.017)
Number of (log) conceptions March 1996 7547 8.928
Number of observations 48 48
Adjusted R-Squared 0.783 0.784
p-value (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000
Notes: ?, ??, and ??? denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The
dependent variable is the (log) number of conceptions in March 1996. The regression specification
assumes a linear time trend. The sample period covers all conceptions within the four years
preceding March 1996.
The resulting estimates, shown in table 3.3, imply that 631, or about 9.1% (=
100% · 631/(7547 − 631)), additional children were conceived in March 1996 on top
of what would have been expected in the absence of the policy change. Remember
that our baseline model yields an estimate of 591 additional births in December 1996
(see table 3.1) – almost the same number as our estimate for the additional number of
conceptions in March 1996. The fact that both results are very much in line with each
other suggests that conception (re-)scheduling, rather than birth timing by medical
intervention, is the underlying cause of the observed fertility response. Section 3.5.1
below provides additional evidence in line with this result, showing that there is no
impact on the fraction of cesarean sections conducted in December 1996. Finally, note
that it is likely that the number of couples trying to move baby plans forward is likely
to be higher than those 616 who finally succeeded.17
17A rough approximation of the total number of responding couples is obtained by multiplying the
number of extra births with the probability of becoming pregnant within three weeks. Gnoth et al.
(2003) study the likelihood of spontaneous conception in subsequent cycles for a random sample of
German women and find that cumulative probabilities of conception at one, three, six and twelve
cycle(s) are, respectively, 38%, 68%, 81% and 92%. A linear interpolation between month zero and
month one yields a cumulative probability of conception of 29% at week three, which implies that
approximately 2038 (= 591/0.29) couples were induced to bring their baby plans forward. Relative
to the December 1996 birth count that would have occurred in the absence of the policy change, the
responsive sample thus amounts to as much as 29% (= 2038/(7613− 591)).
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3.5 Taking Risks for the Bonus?
3.5.1 Birth Complications
We now try to understand whether mothers (un)consciously take health risks for
themselves and/or their newborn child when trying to obtain the bonus. We start
looking at birth complications. In the following we consider instrumental vaginal
delivery mechanisms (forceps delivery, vacuum extraction, and breech delivery) as
indication of birth complications, as all three delivery methods involve potential health
risks for mother and/or child and are thus applied in emergency situations only. While
the former two types of assisted deliveries are used in case of maternal exhaustion,
fetal distress, or a combination of both, the latter method is used in labor with a baby
in head-down position. For simplicity, we will refer to these instrumental vaginal
delivery mechanisms as “birth complications” in what follows. Cesarean section is
considered separately because it has been performed upon request more recently for
deliveries that could otherwise have been natural, even though it is usually performed
only when a vaginal delivery would put baby’s or mother’s life or health at risk.
Accordingly, we think that a cesarean section must be viewed as an instrument for
deliberate birth timing – in line with the results from Gans and Leigh (2009) and
Tamm (2009).
To estimate the impact of the abolition of the bonus on the incident of birth
complications, we use basically the same regression specification as above but with the
percentage share of birth complications as dependent variable. Because information
on birth procedure is only reported from 1995 onwards, we use data from both before
and after the policy change to estimate the impact on birth procedures. Specifically,
the sample period covers the period from January 1995 to October 1996 and from
January 1998 to December 2006.18
Table 3.4 reports the baseline result for the percentage of overall birth complica-
tions (column 2), as well as for single birth procedures (columns 3 to 5). Finally, the
last column shows the estimated impact on the percentage of cesarean sections. We
find that there is a statistically significant and substantial increase in the percentage of
overall birth complications of about 0.9 percentage points in the month prior to aboli-
tion of the baby bonus. Note that this corresponds to a relative increase in the proba-
bility of experiencing some birth complication by almost 14% (= 100%·(0.924/6.778)).
In absolute numbers, the figures imply that 70 additional complications were observed
in December 1996. The following three columns show results by individual delivery
18Running the same model, but excluding either two or three years (instead of one year) in between,
yields very similar estimates.
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method. Estimates show a significant increase for all but one of the instrumental
vaginal birth procedures (forceps delivery). The overall increase in the share of labor
complications is thus mainly driven by an increase of breech deliveries and vacuum
extractions. In terms of non-vaginal instrumental delivery methods, column 6 reveals
an insignificant estimate for the percentage share of cesarean sections, suggesting that
women did not use this method to deliberately manipulate the date of birth.
Table 3.4: Birth Complications
Any birth Vacuum Forceps Breech Cesarean
complication extraction delivery delivery section
Percentage share of births
Residual Dec 1996 0.924??? 0.463?? 0.114 0.347??? 0.061
(0.260) (0.218) (0.093) (0.088) (0.517)
Share Dec 1996 6.778 4.282 1.274 1.222 13.740
Nr of observations 130 130 130 130 130
Adjusted R2 0.321 0.799 0.914 0.896 0.982
p-value (F-stat.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: ?, ??, and ??? denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The
dependent variable in column 2 is the overall percentage share of birth complications (corresponding
to the sum of columns 3 to 5), while columns 3 to 6 show the estimated impact on single delivery
methods. The underlying sample period covers observations within the interval from 1995.1 to
1996.10 as well as the interval from 1998.1 to 2006.12. The time trend is assumed to follow a
fourth-order polynomial, and a dummy variable for each major policy change within this period is
included (1997.1, 2000.7, 2002.1).
One potential explanation of this finding is that responsive mothers are simply
a selected group of mothers. If (some of) the characteristics of these mothers are
associated with preexisting conditions encouraging birth complications, such as age
at birth, differential fertility responsiveness may mechanically affect the incidence of
birth complications.19 To get an idea of how important compositional changes are
in explaining the observed increase in the likelihood of experiencing some birth com-
plication, we run an additional decomposition exercise based on individual-level data
(see appendix 3.A for details). The decomposition results suggest that only a small
fraction, about 12%, of the observed increase in the likelihood of experiencing some
birth complication can be related to observable compositional changes resulting from
differential responsiveness. It is clear, however, that we cannot rule out that addi-
19For example, Rayl et al. (1996) show that maternal characteristics like primiparity and older
maternal age are associated with an increased risk of breech birth. The Austrian data show a very
similar picture: the major determinants for both instrumental non-vaginal and instrumental vaginal
delivery are primiparity and older age (results not shown).
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tional, unobserved maternal characteristics (such as mothers’ health status) explain
some of the increased risk of experiencing some birth complication as well.
At the same time, the fact that observable maternal characteristics explain only a
minor part of the increased risk of birth complications also opens up the possibility of
an alternative explanation. Specifically, we may plausibly think of the babies moved
forward as mistimed pregnancies, in the sense that these pregnancies occurred earlier
than initially planned or desired, and there is evidence that mistimed pregnancy is
associated with increased behavioral and psychological risks.20 First, the most impor-
tant behavioral risks associated with mistimed pregnancies are smoking, drinking, and
diet; and such behavior is known to be associated with complications at birth (Cheng
et al., 2009; Cnattingius and Lambe, 2002). Other studies have found that mistimed
pregnancies are associated with psychological distress. For example, Orr et al. (1997)
find that women with a mistimed pregnancy are more likely to show depressive symp-
toms than women with an intended pregnancy. Similarily, Cheng et al. (2009) find
that women with a mistimed pregnancy are more likely to suffer from postpartum
depression. Increased psychological distress during pregnancy in turn appears to be
associated with an increased risk of pregnancy complications (Mulder et al., 2002;
Norbeck and Tilden, 1983).
3.5.2 Newborns’ Health
We next explore the direct impact on newborns’ health using several distinct health
measures: the incidence of a preterm birth, low birth weight, length at birth and the
Apgar score, which is a measure for quickly assessing the health of a newborn (cf.
footnote 9). We expect to find differences in the health of children born in December
1996 for the same reasons as for birth complications. If newborns’ health is associated
with characteristics of the mother, differences in the health of newborn children may
simply result from heterogeneous fertility responses. While compositional changes
may have positive or negative effects on newborns’ health, the additional behavioral
and psychological risks potentially triggered by a mistimed pregnancy are expected
to unambiguously harm the health of the newborn.21
20In the medical and epidemiological literature, a mistimed pregnancy is usually defined as a
pregnancy that occurred earlier than desired (e.g. Cheng et al., 2009). Under normal circumstances,
antedating a child is a conscious action and should not be considered a mistimed pregnancy. In
our case, however, incentives to antedate a child were increased exogenously while other relevant
circumstances (e.g. financial situation, health behavior, workload, size of the apartment) remained
unchanged. In such a situation, one may argue that mothers are exposed to similar risks as in the
case of a truly mistimed pregnancy.
21For example, Pulley et al. (2002) find that the mistiming of a pregnancy positively correlates
with the probability of a preterm delivery (and low birth weight). They conclude that pregnancies
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Table 3.5: Newborns’ Health
Small birth Low birth Premature
Poor health length weight birth
(Apgar < 7) (< 45 cm) (< 2500 g) (< 37 weeks)
Percentage share of births
Residual Dec 1996 0.017 −0.021 0.078 0.170
(0.132) (0.212) (0.301) (0.267)
Share Dec 1996 1.352 2.522 5.713 5.254
Nr of observations 97 97 97 97
Adjusted R2 0.235 0.523 0.632 0.741
p-value (F-statistic) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: ?, ??, and ??? denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The
dependent variable is the percentage share of newborn children that are in poor health (indicated
by a low Apgar score), of small birth length, of low birth weight or born prematurely. We use
the average of a child’s Apgar score 1, 5, and 10 minutes after birth. The sample period in each
case covers observations within the interval from 1992.11 to 1996.10 as well as the interval from
1998.1 to 2001.12.
Table 3.5 shows the resulting estimates for four different, more or less direct health
measures. All estimates are derived applying the same estimation strategy as in the
case of the fertility responsiveness (see section 3.4 above). The sample period covers
the four years before and after the abolition of the benefit. The first column shows the
effect on the percentage of newborn children with a low Apgar score (i.e. a score lower
than 7). The resulting point estimate is small and statistically not different from zero.
Similarly, we do not find any negative effect on the likelihood of small birth length,
of low birth weight or of a premature birth.22 Overall, we thus find no statistical
evidence for any (immediate) negative impact on the health of newborn children –
despite the fact that we find evidence of increased labor complications, which would
suggest that the abolition of the baby bonus put some children at risk. Of course, this
finding thus not rule out the existence of any health effect in the medium or the long
run.
that are mistimed by more than a few months may have severe health consequences for both mother
and child. Similar results for unintended (i.e. both mistimed and unwanted) births are reported by
Orr et al. (2008).
22Note that it may make sense to look at the share of premature births conceived in March rather
than born in December 1996. This is because babies conceived within the relevant time window of
three weeks following the announcement, when born prematurely, would have been born at most 8.5
months later and thus probably already in November. However, this yields an insignificant estimate
as well.
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3.6 Conclusions
We study the fertility and health effects preceding the abolition of the Austrian baby
bonus on January 1, 1997. Even though the bonus was rather small relative to other
family benefits available, it was still worth about 4.5% of the median annual labor
income in the year of its abolition. Moreover, because the abolition was made public
about ten months in advance, prospective parents not only had a financial incentive
but also the possibility to react without the need of medical intervention.
We find that about 8% (roughly 600) more babies were born than in the absence
of (the public announcement of) the policy change in December 1996, the month
before the abolition of the baby bonus. This effect proves to be robust to a variety
of robustness checks. Also, considering the fact that the window of opportunity was
quite a short period of about three weeks only, the fertility response appears to be
quite large. We also find (re-)scheduling of conceptions rather than direct birth timing
(through medical intervention) to be the source of the fertility response. Our analysis
of birth procedures further reveals a significant and substantial increase in the fraction
of mothers experiencing some kind of birth complications by about one percentage
point (a relative increase in the likelihood of about 14%). We calculate that only
a small fraction of this increase in birth complications can be attributed to changes
in observable maternal characteristics. It thus appears plausible that some part of
the unexplained increase in birth complications is caused by an underlying increase in
behavioral and/or psychological risks triggered by the mistiming of pregnancies (while
the other part is best viewed as being caused by unobserved maternal characteristics).
However, the increase in birth complications notwithstanding, we do not find any
adverse immediate impact on newborns’ health.
On a more general level, our results illustrate that announcement effects may be
an important issue in health policy reforms, and the abolition of he Austrian birth
benefit clearly shows that even relatively small changes in financial incentives may
trigger substantial behavioral responses. Policy makers should thus be aware that not
only a policy (reform) itself, but also the public announcement of its abolition (or
introduction) may have an impact on individual behavior. Second, our results also
suggest that policy announcements may lead some individuals to make bad choices in
the sense that they unconsciously take health risks in return for a short-run financial
benefit. Even though we cannot pin down the importance of this mechanism exactly,
it seems fair to say that dealing with announcement effects appears to be especially
important in the context of health policy, both in the planning and implementation
as well as in the ex-post evaluation of specific policy measures.
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3.A Appendix
Decomposing the Increase in Birth Complications
To explore whether the increase in birth complications is due to unobserved stress or
due to selection, we perform a simple regression-based decomposition analysis based
on individual-level data (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). The goal of this exercise is to
determine the impact of selective fertility responses on the likelihood of some birth
complication. For the decomposition analysis we simply compare mothers who gave
birth in December 1996 with mothers who gave birth in December 1995. Table A.1
shows the results (note that the two columns differ only in the weighting scheme used
for the decomposition).
Table A.1: Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
Dependent variable Any birth complication
Prediction December 1996 0.0736??? 0.0736???
(0.0063) (0.0063)
Prediction December 1995 0.0633??? 0.0633???
(0.0063) (0.0063)
Difference 0.0104 0.0104
(0.0069) (0.0069)
Decomposition
Explained 0.0014?? 0.0012?
(0.0007) (0.0007)
[13.517%] [11.359%]
Unexplained 0.0090 0.0092
(0.0088) (0.0090)
Number of observations: December 1996 7,613 7,613
Number of observations: December 1995 7,032 7,613
Weights Dec. 1995 Dec. 1996
Notes: ?, ??, and ??? denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is
a binary variable indicating any birth complication.
In line with the corresponding results from table 3.4, the upper part of table A.1
documents a difference in the likelihood of experiencing some birth complication of
about one percentage point (in table A.1, however, the difference is not statistically
significant). The lower part of the table shows the decomposition results, revealing
that about 12-14% of the observed difference in the probability of some birth com-
plication is explained by differences in observed maternal characteristics between the
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two groups of mothers. Consequently, 86-88% of the difference remains unexplained.
The extent to which the unexplained part of the increase in birth complications
is driven by an underlying increase in behavioral and/or psychological risks from
the mistiming of births depends on whether the included variables describe maternal
characteristics comprehensively. If the omitted variables are correlated with respon-
siveness to the incentive and therefore with group affiliation, then the unexplained
part of the decomposition might capture not only increased behavioral/psychological
risks, but also other unobserved group differences. In particular, if responding moth-
ers are of poorer health than average mothers and poorer health (which is not ob-
served) is positively correlated with the probability for labor complications, then the
unexplained part of the differential would be upward biased and therefore not only
capture increased behavioral/psychological risks triggered by mistimed pregnancies.
A second issue is whether the included characteristics are affected by the behav-
ioral/psychological risks themselves, which seems unlikely in our setup, however).
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CHAPTER 4
Cultural Distance and Attitudes Towards Immigration: Evidence
from Swiss Voting Results
“Tolerance, inter-cultural dialogue and respect for diversity are more es-
sential than ever in a world where peoples are becoming more and more
closely interconnected.”
Kofi Annan, Former Secretary-General of the United Nations.
4.1 Introduction
Globalization, including the internationalization of labor markets, enhanced trans-
port, and communication technology, accompanied by increasing economic differences
between countries has opened up the possibilities for immigration from less developed
countries. As a consequence, global international migration is increasing not only in
scale but also in the cultural diversity of groups involved in that movement (Hugo,
2005; OECD, 2001). As a result, the host countries have to cope with increased levels
of social and cultural diversity and thus face new challenges that may not only lead
to additional costs but also cause social tensions or even stir up anti-immigration
sentiments.
In this chapter, I shed light on the impact of immigration on anti-immigration at-
titudes from a novel perspective. First, instead of using attitudinal survey data, I take
advantage of Switzerland’s system of direct democracy, where citizens vote regularly
on immigration issues; I transform these voting results into a share of anti-immigration
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votes and use them as a direct measure of attitudes towards immigration. Second, I
focus on understanding how the cultural distance between the immigrant and the res-
ident population affects this relationship. For this purpose, I classify immigrants into
different cultural groups based on findings from the World Value Surveys (WVSs), and
calculate culture-specific immigrant shares. I consider two groups of immigrants for
the main part of the analysis. In particular I differentiate between nationalities with
a values system similar to the Swiss (culturally similar immigrants) and nationalities
without one (culturally different immigrants).
In summary, I investigate whether and to what extent natives’ attitudes toward
immigration, measured by the proportion of anti-immigration votes, are causally re-
lated to the culture-specific immigrant shares of the locality in which they live. The
hypothesis is that Swiss citizens residing in municipalities with a higher immigrant
share are more likely to vote for a more restrictive immigration policy, and that this
effect is more pronounced the larger the fraction of culturally different immigrants.
The idea behind this is that immigrants with different cultural values and beliefs may
be perceived as threatening the national culture such as language, religion, or way of
life in general.
In order to explore this question, I combine outcomes of national votes about immi-
gration between 1970 and 2010 on municipality-level with Swiss census data. To take
endogeneity of the place of residence of both natives and immigrants into account,
I follow Dustmann and Preston (2001) and instrument the immigrant share in the
municipality with the immigrant share in the local labor market. Identification there-
fore relies on the assumption that an individual’s mobility is geographically limited
by exogenous factors like family and friends. In other words, the assumption is that
racially motivated mobility only exists within and not between local labor markets.
Exploiting information on individuals’ mobility, I analyze residential relocations by
natives in response to immigration, and provide evidence that strongly supports the
validity of the identifying assumption. The local labor market immigrant share can
thus be regarded as exogenous, while showing a large correlation with the municipal
immigrant share. It is therefore likely to be a good instrument, at least in the Swiss
context. Moreover, it must be emphasized that, by instrumenting the municipality
immigrant share with the one at a larger geographical region, I explicitly allow for
residential mobility response of natives across municipality borders.1
1The immigration literature typically uses historical settlement patterns of immigrants in a mu-
nicipality to instrument the current local immigrant share. However, if natives respond to immigrant
inflows and move across community borders (as the results from table 4.6 suggest), the IV estimate
is likely to be downwardly biased because the negatively affected individuals are more likely to move
elsewhere. In contrast, using the local labor market immigrant share as instrument explicitly allows
for this type of mobility response.
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The central finding of this chapter is that it is not the overall immigrant share
per se, but merely the presence of culturally different immigrants that induces Swiss
citizens to vote for a more restrictive immigration policy. In fact, the local share of
culturally different immigrants turns out to be a significant and sizable determinant
of the proportion of anti-immigration votes. Baseline estimates suggest that a one
percentage point increase in the share of culturally different immigrants results in a
1.12 percentage point increase in the share of anti-immigration votes. By contrast, the
share of culturally similar immigrants does not seem to affect natives’ voting behavior
at all. This result also holds for a finer cultural classification of immigrants as well
as for each single vote. An additional interesting finding is that the local share of
culturally different immigrants is a likewise important determinant of the percentage
of right-wing voters, implying a tight link between Swiss citizens’ voting behavior in
plebiscites in comparison to elections.
The present chapter can be put into the context of the existing literature as follows.
First , it adds to the literature on immigration and its impact on immigration policy.
However, I am only aware of one other study that investigates the relationship between
the local immigrant share and voting results. In this study, Tolbert and Hero (1996)
analyze the results about California’s illegal immigration initiative and find that both
homogeneous counties with predominantly white population as well as counties with
large Latino populations strongly support the initiative.2 However, these findings do
not address the endogeneity of immigration and are therefore not able to establish
a causal relationship. Studies that analyze the impact of immigration on election
outcomes are closely related. For example, Halla et al. (2012) provide evidence in
a recent paper for a causal link between immigration in Austria and electing the
right-wing party, FPO¨. They find that a rise in the local immigrant share by one
percentage point leads to an increase in the share of right-wing votes by 0.4 percentage
points. Moreover, their results suggest that it is mainly the presence of medium-skilled
immigrants that causes voters to lean to the far-right.
Second , the chapter contributes to the literature that relates the local immigrant
share to a measure for attitudes towards immigrants based on attitudinal survey
questions. Several sociological studies provide suggestive evidence; see for instance,
Mart´ınez i Coma and Duval Herna´ndez (2009); Meuleman et al. (2009); Quillian
(1995); Schneider (2008); Semyonov et al. (2006). The literature concludes that anti-
foreigner attitudes are positively related to immigration rates. However, all these
studies treat the immigrant share as being exogenous. The only exception I am aware
2The illegal immigration initiative denies social services, non-emergency health care, and educa-
tion to illegal immigrants and requires public agencies to report suspected illegal immigrants to state
and federal authorities.
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of is the paper by Dustmann and Preston (2001). Using data from the British Social
Attitudes Survey, they find a significant negative effect of the local minority share
(immigrants from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean) on attitudes towards minorities.
Although surveys have the advantage that they contain specific attitudinal informa-
tion, they have also some disadvantages. First, there is evidence that survey data
suffer from a “hypothetical bias”. This type of bias arises because individuals have
little incentive to reveal their true preferences, knowing that their answer will have no
real consequences (see, for example, Miguet (2008)). By contrast, it is likely that vot-
ing results reflect true sentiments toward immigration because the result is binding.3
A further advantage related to voting results is that they allow me to make direct
statements about the magnitude of the effects.
Third, this chapter is related to the literature that uses survey data in order
to investigate potential causes of anti-immigration attitudes. The majority of these
studies focus on the economic channel (labor market concerns, welfare concerns), but
only little evidence exists on the importance of the non-economic channel (cultural
concerns).4 The latter indicate that opposition towards further immigration is related
to immigrants’ origins in such a way that opposition is larger with increasing ethnic
difference (Card et al., 2005; Dustmann and Preston, 2007).
Fourth, by estimating culture-specific effects, this chapter is also related to the
literature on immigrant culture and their economic outcomes. For instance, Ferna´ndez
and Fogli (2009) show that culture is a significant determinant of economic outcomes
like female labor supply and fertility. The results of my study actually go further by
showing that immigrants’ culture even affect other people’s attitudes towards them.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 briefly outlines the cultural
concept based on the findings of the WVSs and explains the separation of Swiss
immigrants into different cultural groups. Section 4.3 describes the nature of my data
and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4.4 presents the empirical model and
explains the identification strategy. Section 4.5 presents and discusses the results, and
section 4.6 concludes.
3A second reason relates to the political discussion preceding a vote which may enable individuals
to make a more informed decision on the issue up for vote than in the case when answering a survey
question.
4In fact, the evidence on economic determinants is somewhat ambiguous. Some studies suggest
that fears about labor market competition strongly shape individual attitudes towards immigrants
(Mayda, 2006; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Other studies find either no evidence for the labor
market channel (Card et al., 2005; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; O’Connell, 2011), or suggest that
labor market concerns are not a significant determinant once unobserved cultural values and beliefs
are controlled for (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Mu¨ller and Tai, 2010). Far less contentious is
the finding that fears related to welfare concerns and public burden play an important role in the
formation of attitudes (Dustmann and Preston, 2004, 2007; Mu¨ller and Tai, 2010).
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4.2 Cultural Values and Beliefs
Since the focus of this chapter lies in evaluating the rule of cultural distance between
the resident and the immigrant population in connection with anti-immigration atti-
tudes, I like to first of all clarify what I mean by the term “cultural values”.
I follow the concept of the World Value Surveys (WVS); more precisely, I rely on
the influential findings in Inglehart and Baker (2000) who, using the first three waves
of the WVS (1981-1999), isolate two major value dimensions and calculate the corre-
sponding country scores. The so-called global cultural map, as shown in figure A.1
in the appendix, visualizes their results. It shows how scores of countries are located
on these two dimensions, which are first, traditional vs. secular-rational values and
second, survival vs. self-expression values. Thus, the global cultural map measures
cultural and not geographic proximity. The first dimension reflects the contrast be-
tween countries in which religion, parent-child-ties, and deference to authority are very
important and those in which they are not. The second dimension is linked with the
rise of a postindustrial society in which an increasing share of the population grows up
taking survival for granted and attaches increasing emphasis on subjective well-being
and self-expression.5
Based on these two value dimensions, I separate Swiss immigrants into different
cultural groups. For the main part of the analysis, I only differentiate between two
groups; (1) nationalities with a similar value system to that of the Swiss, and (2)
nationalities who contrast with the Swiss value system in at least one dimension. In
section 4.5.2, I further decompose the latter group depending on whether their value
difference is one- or two-dimensional. Table 4.1 presents a summary of the ethnic
composition of the two groups along with the characterizing values.
The first group, containing culturally similar immigrants, comprises countries that
are, like Switzerland, located at the upper right quadrant of the global cultural map.
This group encompasses all historically protestant and catholic non-ex-Communist
countries as well as the English-speaking OECD countries. They exhibit relatively
high (low) secular-rational (traditional) values on the one side and relatively high
(low) self-expression (survival) values on the other side. While the former reflects
a high emphasis on gender equality, tolerance of human diversity and high levels of
trust rather than traditional roles and absolute norms, the latter reflects values of a
postindustrial welfare state.
5These two value dimensions have been shown to explain 70% of the total cross national variation
in values and beliefs. Another result of Inglehart and Baker (2000) is that the broad cultural heritage
of a society - Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, English-speaking, Confucian, or ex-Communist - leaves
an imprint on values that endure despite modernization. See also Inglehart and Welzel (2005)
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Table 4.1: Drivers of cultural differences between the two groups of Swiss immigrants
Characteristic Swiss and culturally similar societies Culturally different societies
Panel A: Cultural heritage:
Cultural zones Historically protestant, catholic Historically Communist, Confu-
non ex-Communist Europe and cian, South Asian, African and
english speaking OECD countries Latin American countries
Panel B: Economic development:
Industriali- Low (high) traditional (secular- Low (high) traditional (sec.-rat.)
zation driven rational) values: values in ex-Communist and
values - high emphasis on gender equality hist. Confucian societies
- increasing tolerance of human High (low) traditional (sec.-rat.)
diversity values in South Asia, Africa,
- relatively high levels of trust Latin America
Postindustrial Low (high) survival (self- High (low) survival (self-expr.)
driven values expression) values: values in ex-Comm. societies,
- good health (high life expectancy) South Asia and Africa
- increasing intellectual resources Equal importance of survival and
- high level of subjective well-being self-expression values in the
- emphasis on self-expression hist. catholic (Europe, Latin
- political activism America), Confucian societies
GDPpc Median is > 25’000 Median is < 15’000
Effective high levels in late 1990s low levels in late 1990s
democracy
Notes: This table uses results from the World Value Survey (WVS). Especially, it bases on findings
by Inglehart and Baker (2000) and Inglehart et al. (2003). The per capita GDP is taken from the
Penn World Table. It is purchasing power adjusted (real), in USD at 2005 constant prices.
The second group, containing culturally different immigrants, is composed of two
slightly different groups. On the one side there are the historically Communist and
Confucian countries that do not contrast the Swiss value system in the first, but
do so in the second dimension. In particular, the shift away from traditional values
towards an emphasis on secular-rational values has already taken place. However, with
respect to post-industrial driven values, the historically Communist and Confucian
countries differ from Switzerland in that their focus still is on survival rather than
on self-expression values. On the other side there are the South Asian, African, and
Latin American countries whose values contrast with the Swiss value system in both
dimensions, meaning that these societies have experienced neither the post-industrial
nor the industrialization driven value shift. As a consequence, they exhibit relatively
low levels of trust and tolerance and place low emphasis on gender equality.6
6The two groups also show different levels of wealth as well as different levels of effective democracy
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Figure 4.1 depicts the correlation between the proportion of anti-immigration votes
(which I will describe in detail in the following section) and the share of culturally
different immigrants in panel (a) and the share of culturally similar immigrants in
panel (b). It suggests that cultural distance, as measured by the WVSs, in fact might
be a crucial factor in explaining anti-immigration attitudes of the resident population.
While there is a positive relationship between the proportion of anti-immigration
votes and the share of culturally different immigrants, the reverse picture emerges for
culturally similar immigrants.7
Figure 4.1: Correlation between immigrant share and share of anti-immigration votes
(a) Culturally different immigrants (b) Culturally similar immigrants
Note: This figure shows the correlation between the share of culturally different (similar)
immigrants and the proportion of anti-immigration votes at municipality-level.
4.3 Data and Descriptives
4.3.1 National Votes on Immigration
The Swiss foundation for research in social sciences (FORS) provides the results of
all national votes that took place in Switzerland between 1970 and 1981. Since 1981
official statistics provided by the Federal Statistical Office (FSO) have provided this
information. The data are aggregated on municipality-level and contain exact infor-
(Inglehart et al., 2003). While the median 1990 per capita GDP amounts to $25’000 in advanced
industrial countries (Switzerland and culturally similar countries), it does not even amount to $15’000
in culturally different countries.
7This negative correlation may seem strange at first sight, however, it most likely reflects the fact
that culturally similar immigrants mainly settle in urban areas where natives also tend to be less
hostile to foreigners.
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mation on the percentage share of affirmative votes and voter turnout.8
I basically use all votes on immigration topics, the only exception being votes with
a very clear result, i.e. I exclude votes with a percentage share of affirmative votes of
above 70% or below 30%. The underlying reason is that very clear results potentially
reflect some kind of general belief rather than a specific attitude toward immigration
and, even more importantly, that those who voted against the majority opinion are
likely to be a very selected group of individuals. This restriction leads to the exclusion
of four votes, leaving me with a sample of 23 votes. Table A.1 in the appendix provides
an overview of all the votes.9
As apparent from the titles of the single votes, acceptance sometimes means a
liberal opinion towards immigration, sometimes it means the opposite. To make votes
comparable, I transform the share of affirmative votes into a share of anti-immigration
votes. Column six of table A.1 shows whether or not a yes-vote implies support for
a more restrictive immigration policy. My dependent variable therefore reflects the
share of municipality-level support for anti-immigration policies, which I simply will
refer to as anti-immigration votes in the following.
Figure A.2 in the Appendix, showing box-plots of the share of anti-immigration
votes for each single votes, illustrates that there is a large variation in the dependent
variable between municipalities. In addition, the figure suggests that there is no clear
pattern apparent that the common opinion on immigration has changed in an obvious
way over time.
4.3.2 Swiss Population Census
The immigrant shares as well as socio-economic and demographic control variables
of Swiss citizens are calculated beginning in 1970 from the decennial Swiss popula-
tion census. The completeness as well as the high data quality allows me to neglect
problems of measurement error. In addition to extensive information on individual
socio-economic characteristics, the population census reports the country of origin for
each foreign born person. It also contains information on individuals’ places of resi-
dence at the time of the survey as well as five years in the past. This information is
8Note that the voting results prior to 1981 for three of total 26 cantons (Swiss states) could no
longer be reconstructed on the municipal, but only on the cantonal, level. The cantons concerned
are Aargau, Freiburg, and Tessin.
9The votes that are excluded are the following: Vote 265 in 1977, which was a popular initiative
to restrict immigration. The initiative was rejected with 29% yes-votes. Vote 417 in 1994, and votes
454 and 455 in 1999 were all about alternations in federal law on immigration or asylum policy. All
three bills were accepted with more than 70% yes-votes. Nonetheless, these votes are used within
the range of a robustness check. See footnote 18 for further information.
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insightful in terms of individual mobility behavior and is used to test the plausibility
of the identifying assumption in chapter 4.4.2.
Because the census data are only recorded every ten years, I do not have census
data for each possible voting year. To still exploit the whole variety of votes, I relate
each vote to the year of the nearest census. Column three of table A.1 shows the
imputed census year for each vote. However, results turn out to be virtually identical
when the data are merged differently.10
An immigrant is defined as resident without a Swiss passport, but it should be
noted that citizenship in Switzerland does not depend on place of birth.
My main regressors are culture-specific immigrant shares aggregated on munici-
pality-level. The calculation is done by first classifying immigrants by country of
birth into different cultural groups, and then calculating immigrant shares within
these groups. As mentioned above, I confine myself to the following two groups for
the main part of the analysis; (1) culturally similar immigrants and (2) culturally
different immigrants. Table 4.2 shows how the size and spatial distribution of these
two immigrant groups has evolved over time.
Table 4.2: Main explanatory variables
Culturally different immigrants Culturally similar immigrants
Decade Mean SD p25 p50 p75 Mean SD p25 p50 p75
1970 0.014 0.010 0.006 0.012 0.021 0.158 0.082 0.108 0.154 0.202
1980 0.027 0.018 0.012 0.024 0.039 0.121 0.074 0.068 0.118 0.153
1990 0.056 0.031 0.031 0.054 0.084 0.124 0.079 0.064 0.117 0.157
2000 0.089 0.051 0.046 0.088 0.134 0.115 0.071 0.061 0.105 0.149
2010 0.087 0.055 0.039 0.082 0.116 0.137 0.071 0.082 0.124 0.189
overall 0.057 0.049 0.018 0.040 0.088 0.131 0.077 0.072 0.123 0.173
Notes: This table is based on municipality-level data, weighted by the corresponding population
size.
There is a strikingly different time trend in the overall size of the two groups.
While culturally similar immigrants remained more or less stable in size, the overall
size of culturally different immigrants increased sharply over the years. The modest
share of 1.4% in the year 1970 increased by a factor of six by the year 2010. Hence,
Switzerland experienced a change in the composition of immigrants as it is typical for
almost all traditional immigration and OECD countries, namely towards increased
10I obtain qualitatively identical and quantitatively very similar results when the data are merged
differently, namely when votes taking place between 1970 and 1979 are related to the 1970 census,
votes taking place between 1980 and 1989 are related to the 1980 census, and so forth.
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ethnic diversity. The table also shows that there is considerable variation in the
immigrant shares across municipalities.
Immigrant shares calculated at the ms-region-level (ms = “mobilite´ spatiale”, or
spatial mobility) provide the instrumental variable. An ms-region is defined based
on the level of economic interactions and commuting patterns of the workforce and
thus represents a local labor market. Switzerland is divided into 104 such ms-regions
which on average encompass 24 municipalities.11 For the purpose of a robustness
check, I also calculate immigrant shares at the canton level. Unlike ms-regions, can-
tons are subnational entities with far-reaching autonomy in taxation policy or in the
educational system, for example. There are 26 cantons, each of which encompasses
an average geographical area of about four ms-regions. Table 4.3 reports all spatial
units used in my analysis along with their number as well as the mean and median
number of municipalities within each unit.
Table 4.3: Spatial units
Number of Number of municipalities:
Spatial unit spatial units Median Mean Std. dev.
Ms-region 104 20 24 17
Canton 26 64 98 102
NUTS2 7 307 363 234
Country 1 2544 2544 .
Note: This table reports for selected spatial units the number as well as the mean and
the median of the number of municipalities within each unit.
NUTS2 regions, as listed in row three, represent catchment areas of Switzerland’s
seven main economic centers and are included as dummy variables in some of the model
specifications. An important feature of NUTS2 regions is that their borders largely
represent language borders.12 Finally, as shown in the last column, the total number
of municipalities amounts to 2544. I deal with time-varying municipality structures
by creating a balanced panel of municipalities based on a slightly modified version
of the territorial boundaries of the year 2000. My final dataset therefore consists of
58’512 observations (23 votes × 2544 municipalities).
11I use a slightly modified version of the official ms-region classification (with 106 ms-regions)
because there are two ms-regions that only encompass one municipality (Davos and Zurich), and
which therefore have been combined with its next closest local labor market (Zurich to Limmattal
and Davos to Schanfigg).
12The definition of the Swiss NUTS2-regions is in compliance with the spatial structures defined
by the statistical office of the European Union (Eurostat) and thus allows for direct regional com-
parisons within Europe. The seven NUTS2-regions are: The lake Geneva region, Espace Mittelland,
Northwestern Switzerland, Zurich, Eastern Switzerland, Central Switzerland, Ticino.
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4.3.3 Descriptives
Table 4.4 sheds light on the ethnic composition of the two groups of Swiss immigrants.
It shows the size of immigrants by country of origin relative to all immigrants for each
decade. Looking first at the composition of culturally similar immigrants as shown
Table 4.4: Immigrants by country of origin over time
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Panel A: Culturally similar immigrants
Italy 0.548 0.454 0.320 0.222 0.161
Spain 0.114 0.117 0.104 0.058 0.036
Germany 0.111 0.095 0.072 0.077 0.147
France 0.052 0.052 0.044 0.043 0.054
Austria 0.042 0.035 0.025 0.021 0.021
UK 0.014 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.021
Netherlands 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.011
USA 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.011
Greece 0.009 0.010 0.007 0.004 0.004
Belgium 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006
Sweden 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Portugal 0.003 0.021 0.092 0.098 0.119
Canada 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004
Liechtenstein 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
Denmark 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Finland 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Oceania 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
0.929 0.837 0.715 0.577 0.606
Panel B: Culturally different immigrants
Former Communist and Confucian countries
Former Yugoslavia 0.023 0.066 0.144 0.250 0.176
Turkey 0.011 0.042 0.068 0.057 0.040
Czechoslovakia 0.012 0.016 0.005 0.004 0.007
Rest of Eastern Europe 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.019
Hungary 0.011 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.004
Poland 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.007
Romania 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
0.063 0.140 0.236 0.331 0.256
Africa, Asia, South America
Asia 0.002 0.007 0.023 0.043 0.065
Africa 0.003 0.008 0.016 0.029 0.044
South America 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.019 0.029
0.008 0.023 0.048 0.091 0.138
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: This table shows the relative size of immigrants by country of origin and decade.
Panel A shows the composition of culturally similar immigrants, Panel B shows the compo-
sition of culturally different immigrants. The latter further distinguishes between countries
which differ from the Swiss and culturally similar immigrants in one cultural dimension,
and countries which differ in both cultural dimensions.
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in panel A, we see that Italians and Spaniards account for the largest share. They
mainly entered the country as labor migrants during the 50’s and 60’s. They ac-
counted for two-thirds of all immigrants in 1970. Following the oil shock in 1973
and the subsequent recession, however, many labor migrants were forced to leave the
country. Subsequently, the number of Italians and Spaniards decreased in both abso-
lute and relative numbers. Since the year 2000, immigrants from Germany represent
the second largest group. They are followed by immigrants from France, Austria,
UK, the Netherlands, and the US who also account for more than one percent of
all immigrants and whose shares have remained quite stable over the years. On the
contrary, the share of Portuguese has increased sharply over time and has reached a
quite remarkable size by now.
Within the group of culturally different immigrants, panel B clearly shows that
immigrants from former Yugoslavia make up the largest share. Many of them entered
the country on a refugee basis after the start of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s.
Immigrants also increasingly come from Turkey, Asia, Africa and from the rest of
Eastern Europe, although to a lesser extent.
Demographic and socio-economic characteristics for Swiss citizens and the two
groups of Swiss immigrants are shown in Table 4.5. Looking first at people’s place of
residence, we see that immigrants are more concentrated in urban areas and in border
communities; the latter mainly applies to culturally similar immigrants. Turning to
the demographic structure, the most prominent difference between Swiss and foreign-
ers is the age and gender pattern. Immigrants are on average younger and more likely
to be male. The former is even more pronounced in the group of culturally differ-
ent immigrants. The education structure of the two immigrant groups is surprisingly
similar. Moreover, the share of individuals with a tertiary education is exactly the
same for all groups, even for the Swiss. The education levels, however, may not be
fully transformable for more different cultural groups. Further differences appear with
regard to individuals’ labor market status. Most striking is the fact that culturally
different immigrants are five times more likely to be unemployed than both the Swiss
and culturally similar immigrants. In contrast, culturally similar immigrants have a
ten percentage point higher employment rate than both other groups. Finally, the
three groups contrast strongly from each other with respect to their religious affilia-
tion. Among the Swiss, Protestants and Catholics are about equally distributed, while
Jews and Moslems do not even make up one percent of the population. Culturally
similar immigrants show a very similar pattern, with the only difference being that
within this group Catholics markedly outweigh Protestants. The religious composition
of culturally different immigrants is completely different. This group only contains
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4% Protestants, and furthermore is approximately one-third Catholics and Moslems
each, and about one-fourth with another religion or none at all.
Table 4.5: Average characteristics
Swiss
Immigrants, culturally
different similar
Area characteristics (place of residence)
Urban area 0.29 (0.23) 0.38 (0.25) 0.39 (0.26)
Living in border community 0.11 (0.31) 0.12 (0.32) 0.15 (0.35)
Individual characteristics
Female 0.52 (0.50) 0.44 (0.49) 0.44 (0.49)
Single 0.43 (0.49) 0.45 (0.49) 0.44 (0.49)
Married 0.46 (0.50) 0.51 (0.49) 0.51 (0.49)
Divorced, widowed 0.11 (0.31) 0.04 (0.20) 0.05 (0.22)
Mean age 38.3 (22.9) 27.6 (16.1) 32.6 (18.7)
15 ≥ age < 25 0.14 (0.34) 0.19 (0.38) 0.15 (0.36)
25 ≥ age < 35 0.14 (0.34) 0.25 (0.43) 0.22 (0.41)
35 ≥ age < 45 0.14 (0.34) 0.18 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38)
45 ≥ age < 55 0.12 (0.32) 0.08 (0.27) 0.12 (0.32)
55 ≥ age < 65 0.11 (0.31) 0.03 (0.16) 0.07 (0.25)
Age > 65 0.15 (0.35) 0.02 (0.12) 0.05 (0.21)
Mandatory education 0.33 (0.46) 0.50 (0.50) 0.50 (0.49)
Secondary education 0.45 (0.49) 0.21 (0.40) 0.26 (0.43)
Tertiary education 0.12 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32)
Other education 0.27 (0.44) 0.37 (0.48) 0.29 (0.45)
Unemployed 0.01 (0.09) 0.05 (0.21) 0.01 (0.11)
Not employed 0.22 (0.41) 0.16 (0.36) 0.14 (0.35)
Employed 0.55 (0.49) 0.54 (0.49) 0.64 (0.47)
Self employed 0.13 (0.33) 0.05 (0.20) 0.05 (0.22)
Family-run shop 0.04 (0.19) 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.08)
Trainee 0.06 (0.23) 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.16)
Management position 0.06 (0.22) 0.02 (0.12) 0.03 (0.17)
Non-management position 0.69 (0.46) 0.79 (0.40) 0.85 (0.35)
Rest 0.03 (0.17) 0.09 (0.28) 0.03 (0.17)
Not in working-age 0.34 (0.47) 0.26 (0.43) 0.24 (0.42)
Evangelic 0.49 (0.49) 0.04 (0.20) 0.11 (0.31)
Catholic 0.43 (0.49) 0.35 (0.47) 0.78 (0.41)
Jewish 0.00 (0.04) 0.01 (0.08) 0.00 (0.06)
Islamic 0.00 (0.04) 0.37 (0.48) 0.00 (0.04)
Other 0.07 (0.25) 0.23 (0.42) 0.11 (0.30)
Born abroad 0.07 (0.24) 0.83 (0.37) 0.76 (0.42)
Notes: This table shows average characteristics of Swiss citizens and the two groups of immigrants
for the years 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000.
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4.4 Empirical Model and Identification
4.4.1 Econometric Framework
The dependent variable is the share of anti-immigration votes in municipality j and
vote v taking place in year t, and thus lies in the interval between zero and one. The
model applied in a first step is OLS with the following baseline specification:
AIVjv[t] = α + β
cIcjt + Z
′
jtγ + X
′
jtδ + ψnv[t] + εjv[t] (4.1)
The key parameter to identify is βc, which denotes how the culture-specific immi-
grant share is related to the proportion of anti-immigration votes. The vector Z′
comprises residential area characteristics such as urbanization rate and whether mu-
nicipality j borders a foreign country. The vector X′ includes the following aggregated
socio-economic characteristics of Swiss citizens; (i) the distribution of labor market
status (share of employed, unemployed, not employed); (ii) the distribution of oc-
cupational status (share of individuals who are self employed, employed by family
member, a trainee, in a management or non-management position); (iii) the distribu-
tion of highest educational attainment (share with primary, secondary and tertiary
education); (iv) the distribution of marital status (share single, married, and widowed
or divorced); (v) average age and age squared; (vi) the gender distribution; (vii) the
distribution of religious affiliation (share Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Moslems and
people with another religion or none at all) and finally, (viii) the share of foreign
born Swiss. The model further includes NUTS2-specific vote fixed effects, denoted by
ψnv[t]. In doing so, I eliminate vote(time)-varying unobserved heterogeneity between
the seven catchment areas of Switzerland’s main economic centers. In other words, I
exploit cross-sectional variation across municipalities within the same NUTS2-region.
Finally, I weight all observations with the population size of the municipalities. While
this will act as benchmark specification, I will additionally provide estimates of alter-
native model specifications to test the robustness of the results.
Since individuals are free to choose their neighborhoods, the immigrant share in
an individuals’ municipality is unlikely to be exogenous. It is reasonable to assume
that xenophobic natives are unlikely to locate in municipalities with a large immigrant
population. At the same time, it seems unlikely that immigrants will settle in areas
where they expect racial discrimination. The OLS estimate of the parameter βc in
equation (4.1) is inconsistent and downward biased under these circumstances.
In order to obtain a consistent estimate of the impact of immigration on voting
results, I apply an IV approach in a second step. Following Dustmann and Preston
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(2001), I instrument the municipal immigrant shares with the immigrant shares in a
larger geographical area. More precisely, I use the immigrant shares in the local labor
markets (ms-regions) because they are based on commuting patterns and thus best
comply with the requirements on a valid instrument, as will become clear in the next
paragraph. The first stage is thus given by the following equation;
Icjt = pi0 + pi
c
1 I
c
lt + Z
′
jtpi2 + X
′
jtpi4 + ψnt + εjt, (4.2)
with Iclt representing the culture-specific immigrant share in time t and ms-region l to
which municipality j belongs to.
I argue that individuals, when choosing the place of residence, first decide upon a
larger geographic region based on family, friends, and employment history. The crucial
point is that the choice does not depend on attitudes towards immigration at this
stage. Only in the second step, when it comes to decide upon the local neighborhood
within the larger settlement region, might the immigrant composition become part of
the decision.13
Thus, the key identifying assumption is that the immigrant share in the larger
geographic region (ms-region) is exogenously determined by factors like family and
friends and not influenced by anti-immigration attitudes. Put differently, I assume
that racially motivated mobility only exists within but not between local labor mar-
kets (ms-regions). I test the validity of this assumption in section 4.4.2 by estimating
mobility effects of changes in the municipal immigrant share. The results indeed pro-
vide strong evidence in favor of the identifying assumption. This means that the
immigrant share in the ms-region is uncorrelated with unobserved factors determin-
ing voting behavior. Consequently, Ilt is a valid instrument for Ijt because sorting
within an ms-region, which is that part of the settlement decision that can depend on
attitudes, does not alter the overall ethnic composition of that ms-region.
Identification further requires that the instrument has no direct effect on voting
behavior. This implies that an individual’s attitude toward immigration is assumed to
depend solely on the immigrant concentration in the immediate vicinity (municipality)
and not on the average immigrant share of the ms-region. I perform different checks
to support the plausibility of this assumption. For instance, I use the ms-region
immigrant share ten years earlier as alternative instrument because a direct effect is
13Notice that high foreign labor market competition could lead to a situation in which even job
location and therefore the choice of the local labor market may be endogenous. However, findings
from the 2007 Swiss Household Panel show that only 0.85% of the Swiss population changed residence
within the last two years for employment related reasons. If we further consider that only a fraction
of these 0.85% might have changed their job because of increased foreign competition, this is probably
a minor issue in the particular case of Switzerland.
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less likely to exist for immigrant shares that existed one decade earlier.
I also apply the instrument that is typically used in the literature on immigration,
namely the historical settlement pattern of immigrants in a municipality. This instru-
ment takes advantage of the fact that immigrants are more likely to settle in areas
with already existing shares of people with a similar ethnic background. The identi-
fying assumption is that past migration patterns have no effect on current attitudes,
which seems quite plausible. However, there are some disadvantages associated with
this instrument. First and most importantly, this instrument does not allow for any
residential mobility response of natives across municipality-borders. As a result, using
historical migration patterns as an instrument is likely to produce downward biased es-
timates because the negatively affected individuals are more likely to move elsewhere.
A further drawback of this instrument is that one loses one time period and, consid-
ering that my dataset only covers five decades, this is quite a large loss. Nonetheless,
the results might provide useful insights regarding my identification strategy and can
be compared with the results of other studies.
4.4.2 Validity of the Identifying Assumption
Identification requires that racially motivated mobility by the voting population, i.e.
Swiss citizens, only exist within but not across local labor markets (ms-regions). Since
the population census reports individuals’ places of residence at the time of the survey
as well as five years earlier, I can test the validity of the assumption by estimating the
following equation;
1(rt 6= rt−5)i = α + β∆Ij0t + Z′jotγ0 + Z′jdtγd + X′itδ + ψnt + εit, r ∈ {j, l} (4.3)
where the dependent variable is an indicator function taking on the value one if indi-
vidual i moved within the last five years (between t and t − 5) (a) across a munici-
pality border and (b) across a ms-region border. The vectors Z′jot and Z
′
jdt contain
residential area characteristics (unemployment rate, urbanization rate, and border
municipality) of the origin and destination municipality, respectively. The vector X′
includes individual socio-economic characteristics as specified in equation (4.1). The
parameter of interest is β. It denotes how the change in the immigrant share during
the last decade in the original resident municipality affects the probability of having
left (a) the municipality and (b) the ms-region. The results are shown in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.6: Residential Mobility Effects
OLS Probit
Movements across: Movements across:
Municip. MS-region Municip. MS-region
∆ Ijot −0.056 0.012 −0.191 0.072
(0.179) (0.238) (0.562) (1.275)
mfx [−0.067] [0.012]
(0.197) (0.213)
∆ Icult. diff.jot 0.367
?? 0.088 1.160?? 0.470
(0.184) (0.155) (0.571) (0.890)
mfx [0.406??] [0.079]
(0.200) (0.148)
∆ Icult. sim.jot −0.273 −0.027 −0.903 −0.130
(0.235) (0.315) (0.737) (1.650)
mfx [−0.316] [−0.022]
(0.258) (0.276)
Mean 0.326 0.119 0.326 0.119
Standard deviation 0.469 0.324 0.469 0.324
Number of observations (in ’000) 13’047 13’047 13’047 13’047
Adjusted R-Squared 0.137 0.075
p-value (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Area char. (Z′jo and Z′jd) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual socio-demogr. char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
NUTS2-specific time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
The dependent variable is an indicator function taking on the value one if the individual moved
across municipality or ms-region borders within the past five years and zero otherwise. The main
explanatory variable is the change in the share of culturally different and similar immigrants within
the last ten years, respectively. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered
on municipality-level (2544 clusters). Marginal effects are reported in square brackets.
Results suggest that an increase in the share of culturally different immigrants
causes natives to leave their home municipality, but they provide no evidence for
racially motivated mobility effects across ms-regions. This finding is the same regard-
less of whether an OLS or a probit model is estimated. I interpret this result as strong
evidence in favor of the validity of my identification strategy.14
It should further be noted that this result also implies that instruments that do
not allow for residential mobility response across municipalities, like the historical
settlement pattern of immigrants, underestimate the true effect.
14The analysis for different time periods shows that these effects are slightly decreasing over time
(results not shown but can be provided upon request).
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Main Results
Table 4.7 presents the main results. It shows how the overall immigrant share in
panel A and the culture-specific immigrant shares in panel B affect(s) the share of
anti-immigration votes of an average vote about immigration. Columns two to four use
a simple OLS estimator, columns five to seven report results from using the immigrant
share(s) at the local labor market - the overall share in panel A and the culture-specific
shares in panel B - as instrument(s) for the municipality-level immigrant share(s). All
models include vote fixed effects, and estimates are weighted by the population size
of the municipalities. I report simple correlations between the immigrant shares and
anti-immigration votes in columns two and five (M1), add controls for local area
and socio-economic characteristics in columns three and six (M2), and also allow for
unobserved heterogeneity within votes between different NUTS2-regions in columns
four and seven (M3). The table only reports the estimates of the parameters of
interest, the complete estimation results are reported in table A.2 in the appendix.
As can be seen from panel A, results suggest no direct link between the size of the
overall immigrant population and the share of anti-immigration votes. There is an
initial negative correlation that vanishes, however, the more stringently the model is
specified. This is true for both OLS estimates as well as for IV estimates.
Panel B, showing results for the two cultural groups of immigrants, reveals an
interesting picture. The relative size of culturally different immigrants turns out to be
a significant determinant of the percentage of anti-immigration votes. Both OLS and
IV estimates are positive and statistically significant, although the OLS estimates turn
out to be much smaller than IV estimates. This is consistent with the idea I pointed
out earlier, that the settlement decision of both natives and immigrants depends on
attitudes towards each other. Ignoring this type of endogeneity (as it is the case in the
OLS approach) results in a downward biased estimate. The reported coefficients can
be interpreted as the percentage point change in anti-immigration votes as response
to a one percentage point increase in the immigrant share in the municipality. Thus,
baseline estimates imply that people tend to give 1.12 percentage point more votes in
favor of a more restrictive immigration policy in municipalities which experience a one
percentage point increase in the share of culturally different immigrants. Comparing
the different model specifications, we see that the effect approximately doubled in
size, from 0.49 pp to 1.1 pp, when local area and socio-economic characteristics are
controlled for in addition to vote fixed effects. Additional inclusion of NUTS2-specific
vote fixed effects leads to a further although slight increase, from 1.1 to 1.2 percentage
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points.
Table 4.7: Main Results
Dependent variable: Share of anti-immigration votes
OLS IV (2SLS)
M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Baseline Baseline
Panel A
Ijt −0.266???−0.039 0.018 −0.437???−0.157 0.108
(0.040) (0.025) (0.027) (0.058) (0.110) (0.139)
F-stat. of excl.instr.(Ijt) 278 151 94
Panel B
Icult.diff.jt 0.188
??? 0.190?? 0.140?? 0.489? 1.098??? 1.124???
(0.060) (0.084) (0.066) (0.262) (0.170) (0.217)
Icult.sim.jt −0.520???−0.278??? −0.119???−0.691???−0.406??? −0.201
(0.047) (0.032) (0.034) (0.060) (0.095) (0.136)
F-stat.of excl.instr.(Ic.diffjt ) 107 81 48
F-stat.of excl.instr.(Ic.simjt ) 362 235 140
Mean 0.481 0.481 0.481 0.481 0.481 0.481
Standard deviation 0.152 0.152 0.152 0.152 0.152 0.152
Number of observations 58,512 58,512 58,512 58,512 58,512 58,512
Area characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Socio-demografic char. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
NUTS2-specific vote FEs No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
The dependent variable is the share of anti-immigration votes on municipality-level. The sample
consists of 2544 municipalities and 23 votes (58’512 observations). Robust standard errors are
given in parentheses and are clustered on municipality-level (2544 clusters). All models include
vote fixed effects, and estimates are weighted by the population size of municipality j at time t.
The second row of panel B, showing estimates for the share of culturally similar
immigrants, reveals a quite different picture. First of all, all OLS estimates are signif-
icantly negative, probably reflecting positive self selection in the sense that culturally
similar immigrants are more likely to settle in urban areas where natives often tend to
have more liberal views towards immigration. Applying the instrumental variable ap-
proach, which deals with this type of selection, indeed makes this significant negative
effect disappear, at least in the preferred model specification. Hence, results suggest
no difference in voting behavior between municipalities with low and high shares of
culturally similar immigrants.
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With regard to my identification strategy, notice that the F-statistic on the ex-
cluded instrument(s) is always well above the critical value of 10 as suggested by
Staiger and Stock (1997), alleviating weak-instrument concerns. I also would like
to draw attention to table A.3 in the appendix which reports coefficients from the
first stage and reduced form regressions. The first stage coefficients are all positive
and highly significant, validating the positive relationship between the lower (munic-
ipality) and higher (local labor market) level spatial unit immigrant share. Finally,
the reduced form coefficients turn out to be highly significant for the culture-specific
immigrant shares, implying that there is a causal relationship between the propor-
tion of anti-immigration votes and the culture-specific shares of immigrants within a
municipality.
Hence, the central finding is that the presence of immigrants that differ from the
Swiss with respect to their cultural values and beliefs appears to be a significant and
sizable determinant of the proportion of anti-immigration votes, while the presence of
culturally similar immigrants does not seem to affect natives’ voting behavior at all.
Thus it is not the overall immigrant concentration per se, it is solely the presence of
culturally distant immigrants that affects Swiss citizens’ attitudes. One possible ex-
planation for this finding may relate to natives’ fears that immigrants may undermine
their national culture, language, religion, or way of life (Card et al., 2005). However,
it cannot be ruled out that, aside from cultural concerns (non-economic channel), la-
bor market and welfare concerns (economic channel) might also explain part of the
effect. This is because culture is not the only difference between the two groups of
immigrants. As can be seen in table 4.5, they also differ with respect to labor market
prospects and, even if only to a small extent, in educational attainment.
4.5.2 Robustness
I test the robustness of the baseline results in various dimensions. First, I test the
sensitivity with respect to different covariate and fixed effects specifications as well as
to the use of alternative instruments. Second, I check whether the above findings also
hold for each single vote. A final robustness check relates to the cultural classification
of immigrants.
Specification and identification checks
Table 4.8 presents the results for differing covariate and fixed effects specifications
in columns M4 to M6 and for alternative instruments in columns M7 to M9. For
comparison purposes, the second column simply replicates the baseline results. The
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specifications of model 4 to 6 are as follows: Model 4 differs from the baseline model in
allowing for interaction effects between gender, age, and education. To be precise, this
model includes the gender-age-education distribution with four education categories
and seven ten-year age categories. The point estimates appear slightly larger, but in
statistical terms they remain unchanged. Model 5 differs from the baseline model in
the way it deals with the aggregated nature of the data. While the baseline model
weights all observations by the population size of the corresponding municipality,
model 5 instead includes the population size and the population size squared (in
1’000) as additional control variables. This leads to a significantly larger effect of
the share of culturally different immigrants. Finally, model 6 includes canton-specific
instead of NUTS2-specific vote fixed effects. This means that only the variation within
a canton is exploited in this case. The resulting point estimate is only half as large,
but a look at the F-value of the excluded instrument gives rise to weak-instrument
concerns. Therefore, the point estimates may be biased and have to be taken with
caution. Overall, the estimates of immigration on voting results turn out quite robust
across specifications.15
Consider now the last three columns of table 4.8. These models use the baseline
covariate and fixed effects specifications but apply different instruments. Model 7
uses the 1970 settlement pattern of Swiss immigrants, the disadvantage being that
observations of this decade are lost and, even more importantly, that it does not allow
for any residential mobility response of natives across municipality borders. The point
estimate is 0.7 and thus, in line with expectations, quite a bit smaller compared to
the baseline result.
Model 8 again applies the ms-region level instrument, but instead of the contempo-
raneous immigrant share, it uses the immigrant share of the last decade. The intention
behind this instrument is to assess the validity of the exclusion restriction. Remem-
ber, I assume that the municipality immigrant share encompasses the full range of
influence, meaning that there is no direct effect of the average local labor market
immigrant share on voting behavior. Using the past immigrant share as instrument
sheds light on this issue, as a direct effect is less likely for immigrant shares ten years
earlier. As evident from column M8, the point estimate for the share of culturally dif-
ferent immigrants is 0.92 and thus very similar to the baseline estimate. In statistical
terms they are even identical, which in my view is a strong indication in favor of the
validity of my instrument.16
15As evident form panel B of table A.3 in the appendix, all first stage coefficients show the expected
sign. They are also statistically significant, just like the reduced form coefficients.
16Admittedly, a potential direct effect cannot be completely ruled out because of low individual
mobility and relatively high correlation between ms-region immigrant shares over time (0.63 for
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Finally, model 9 addresses the validity of the identifying assumption. Remember
that although I do not find a significant residential mobility effect across ms-regions,
the point estimate of the change in the immigrant share is positive, meaning that
there still might be a few individuals whose mobility is not entirely restricted to
one ms-region, with the consequence that even my IV estimates might be downward
biased. Using the canton-level immigrant share as instrument sheds light on this
issue because, compared to an ms-region, a canton encompasses a considerably larger
geographic region. As shown in column M9, the effect of the share of culturally
different immigrants indeed turns out to be significantly larger, indicating that some
racially motivated mobility across local labor markets still exists. My baseline IV
results can therefore be regarded as lower bound of the true effects of immigration on
anti-immigration votes.17
Functional form
I test for potential non-linearities by re-running the main model while allowing for
a flexible functional form. More specifically, I include the culture-specific immigrant
shares from the first up to the fourth polynomial. The results provide no evidence for
any economically relevant non-linearities in the effect on anti-immigration votes, nei-
ther for culturally different nor for culturally similar immigrants. I therefore conclude
that the linear model captures the effects well enough.
Single-vote results
All effects discussed so far relate to results of an average vote about immigration. In
consideration of the widely varying contents it appears necessary to examine whether
the results also hold for each single vote. This is done by re-running the baseline
regressions for each vote. Results are depicted in figure 4.2, with the vertical axis
indicating the point estimate (with its 95% confidence interval), and the horizontal
axis indicating the corresponding vote number. For comparison purposes, the estimate
at the far right additionally depicts the overall effect (corresponding to the baseline
IV estimate in table 4.7).
As evident form panel (a), estimates turn out positive for all votes and, with one
exception, they are significantly different from zero. In other words, the share of
culturally different immigrants).
17Even estimates carried out using the canton-level instrument may be downward biased if racially
motivated mobility across canton borders also exists. Further notice that first stage and reduced
form coefficients are also reported in Table A.3 in the appendix. Again, all first stage coefficients
show the expected sign, and both the first stage and reduced form coefficients are highly significant.
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culturally different immigrants positively affects the proportion of anti-immigration
in all but one vote. The vote where I find no significant effect is vote 464 with the
title “federal resolution on bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU”. A
closer look at the precise content of this particular vote reveals that the vote in fact
involved seven bilateral agreements, with the main emphasis being on liberalization
and market opening agreements. The free movement of persons was only one of these
seven agreements, and more importantly, it was only applied to the EU-8 member
states. Under these circumstances, the null effect is no longer surprising.
Figure 4.2: Single-vote results
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Notes: This figure shows point estimates (along with the corresponding 95% CIs) from IV re-
gressions of the proportion of anti-immigration votes on the culture-specific share of immigrants.
All models use the baseline covariate and fixed effects specification.
There is no clear pattern with respect to the size of the effects. Except for the
fact that impacts on votes with the aim of limiting overall immigration are always
larger than average, while votes concerning the free movement agreement with the
EU seem to have a below-average effect. Apart from that, effects are sometimes
above, sometimes below average, independent of whether the vote is on asylum or
refugee questions or on naturalization practices.18
Turning to panel (b), results confirm the previous finding that there is no ev-
idence of a relationship between voting results and the share of culturally similar
immigrants.19
18I obtain similar results for the four votes that are excluded from the main sample because of a
very clear result. More specifically, all coefficients of the share of culturally different immigrants are
positive and statistically significant. They vary in size between 0.7 and 2 percentage points.
19The first stage coefficients again show the expected sign, and the smallest F-value on the excluded
instrument lies with a value of 19 sufficiently above the critical value. The reduced form also exists,
at least in panel (a).
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Overall, this analysis shows that the general picture is quite robust and that the
pattern of the pooled cross-section result also holds for each single vote.
Sensitivity to cultural classification
A final robustness check relates to the cultural classification of Swiss immigrants. A
look at the global cultural map reveals that in contrast to culturally similar immi-
grants, there is quite a lot of heterogeneity in cultural values between societies within
the group of culturally different immigrants. In fact, the latter includes both societies
that differ in one value dimension (i.e. they place high emphasis on survival instead
of self-expression values) and societies that differ in both dimensions (i.e. they further
attach great importance to traditional rather than secular-rational values).
This section aims to investigate whether the effect of the share of culturally dif-
ferent immigrants is driven by one of these two value dimensions. For this purpose I
re-run the baseline model with three groups of immigrants which are (1) culturally sim-
ilar immigrants (unchanged), (2a) culturally different immigrants in one dimension,
and (2b) culturally different immigrants in both dimensions. The ethnic composition
of the two subgroups is shown in panel B of table 4.4. It reveals that the group that
differs in one value dimension is clearly dominated by former Yugoslavs, whereas the
group that differs in both dimensions is quite balanced across South Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. Table 4.9 presents the baseline IV results.
Table 4.9: Sensitivity to cultural classification
Two groups of immigrants Three groups
Icult.diff.jt 1.124
???
(0.217)
Icult.sim.jt −0.201 −0.200
(0.136) (0.125)
Icult.diff.dim1jt 1.120
???
(0.192)
Icult.diff.dim2jt 1.127
??
(0.567)
F-value on excluded instrument (Icult.sim.jt ) 140 102
F-value on excluded instrument (Icult.diff.jt ) 48 108; 11
Number of observations 58,512 58,512
Adjusted R-Squared 0.762 0.762
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
The dependent variable is the share of anti-immigration votes with mean of 0.48 (sd = 0.15). See
table 4.4 for information about the three groups of immigrants. Robust standard errors are given
in parentheses and are clustered on municipality-level. All models use the baseline covariate and
fixed effects specification.
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Interestingly, it does not seem to make a difference whether the value difference is
one- or two-dimensional. The point estimates are significant and with 1.12 and 1.13
virtually identical for both groups of culturally different immigrants. The first stage
and reduced form coefficients are again reported in table A.3 in the appendix. Notice
that the F-value of the excluded instrument for immigrants that differ in both value
dimensions is 11 and thus just above the critical value. This result should therefore
be interpreted with the necessary caution.
I also considered further decomposing the group of culturally similar immigrants.
To be precise, I estimate separate effects for the largest ethnicities, i.e. Italians,
Spaniards, and Germans. However, I fail to find a point estimate that is significantly
different from zero for any of them.
4.5.3 The Role of the Voter Turnout
A fact that has been ignored so far is that voting is not compulsory. As a consequence,
all the findings of the previous analysis are only based on individuals who participate in
the voting process. Since there is evidence that this is a selected group of individuals,
the question arises whether the effect of immigration is the same on the non-voting
persons.20 Unfortunately, there are neither observations whether a person participated
nor what the non-participant would have voted had he or she been forced to.
However, notice that the estimated effects would apply equally to all individu-
als if no unobserved characteristic were to exist that simultaneously influences anti-
immigration attitudes and voting probability. Conversely, if there is a systematic
relationship between participation decision and attitudes towards immigration that
observed individual characteristics do not explain, one would expect to find a correla-
tion between the size of the estimated effects and the voter turnout. I investigate this
issue by re-running the baseline model for different turnout samples. In particular, I
divide the overall sample into 100 subsamples, each containing observations (munici-
pality vote cells) with a particular turnout percentile. I then estimate the effects for
each subsample (turnout percentile) as depicted in figure 4.3.
The vertical axis indicates the impact of the culture-specific immigrant share (in
percentage points), the horizontal axis depicts the corresponding turnout percentile.
The overall variation in voter turnout is quite large. The median turnout corresponds
to 47.8%, the 5th and the 95th percentile correspond to 26.5% and 72.3%, respectively.
20For instance, according to the findings of Miguet (2008) who uses post-vote datasets (VOX
survey) for two votes in Switzerland (votes 355 and 467), participation is significantly more likely for
highly educated and married persons, and for individuals with views at the political extreme.
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Consider the effect of culturally different immigrants first. Interestingly, the results
do not provide any indication of a systematic relationship between the size of the effect
and the voter turnout. For each turnout subsample, IV estimates are statistically
significant and vary between 0.75 and 2.5 with exception of the upper decile. In
those municipalities, the estimated effect is considerably larger (up to 4.75 percentage
points), but so are the standard errors. Results for culturally similar immigrants again
suggest no causal relationship between the share of culturally similar immigrants and
voting results. These patterns are robust to a variety of checks with respect to the
underlying subsamples.21 Also, there is no reason for weak instrument concerns.
Figure 4.3: The role of the turnout
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Notes: These figures show the estimated effects (in pp) of the culture-specific immigrant share
on anti-immigration votes depending on turnout (IV regressions). The grey shaded area depicts
the 95% confidence interval. The effects are estimated for each turnout percentile using a moving
average over two percentiles. All models use the baseline covariate and fixed effects specification.
In sum, the results suggest that no unobserved variable exists that jointly de-
termines participation decision and attitudes towards immigration in a systematic
manner. The effects thus appear to be independent of voter turnout once it is con-
trolled for observed individual characteristics, which implies that even if voting were
mandatory, the effects would be the same. It must be emphasized that this only
applies to the estimated effects. In terms of the vote outcome, it may well be that
forcing everybody to vote would change it. This is because there is reason to expect
a systematic relationship between participation and voting decision. Probably the
most well known characteristic that is associated with participation as well as voting
decision is the level of education. On the one side, there is quite a consensus that the
highly educated individuals are more likely to participate in the voting process (see
21For instance, I also divided the sample into 50 or 20 subsamples, respectively.
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for Switzerland, for instance, Miguet (2008)). On the other side, higher education is
found to be positively correlated with a more liberal mindset (see table A.2 in the
Appendix). Forcing all individuals to vote would thus imply a relative decrease in
liberal views and potentially result in a different outcome of the vote.
4.5.4 The Rise of Switzerland’s Right-Wing Party
Similar to many other European countries, Switzerland has recently experienced a
strong rise of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), a party that mainly attracts attention
because of its fierce anti-immigration program.22 This last section aims at investigat-
ing whether the local presence of immigrants with different cultural values and beliefs
is a similarly important determinant of the percentage of right-wing voters as it is of
the percentage of anti-immigration votes. In other words, I am interested in the link
between voting in favor of a more restrictive immigration policy and supporting the
right-wing party.
To explore this question I draw on results of the parliamentary elections.23 I apply
the same estimation strategy as before, the only difference is the dependent variable,
which now is the share of SVP votes instead of the share of anti-immigration votes.
The sample is somewhat smaller than the sample that is used in the main analysis, the
reason being the slightly different version of the municipality boundaries that is used
in order to record election results. As a consequence, 24 of total 2544 municipalities
cannot be merged to the census data.
Table 4.10 presents the results. The first two columns replicate the baseline results
based on the slightly smaller sample. The last two columns show the impacts of the
culture-specific immigrant shares on the proportion of SVP votes within a municipal-
ity. Besides the point estimates, the table also displays the change in the dependent
variable in units of standard deviation as a result to a one standard deviation change
in the main explanatory variable. These effects are expressed in square brackets.
22From 1970 until 1991, the share of the votes for the SVP in parliamentary elections always lay
at about 10 percent. In subsequent years, however, the party gained more and more support and
reached its highest share of votes in 2007 with about 27 percent. This corresponds to an increase
of almost three hundred percent over a period of just 16 years. The rapid rise of the SVP finally
ended with the 2011 elections, where the party even had to record a slight decrease compared to the
previous election period.
23As the parliamentary elections take place every four years, the election years do not perfectly
coincide with the census years. I therefore merge the 1971 election results to the 1970 census, the
1979 election results to the 1980 census, the 1991 election results to the 1990 census, the 1999 election
results to the 2000 census and finally, the 2011 election results to the 2010 census.
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Table 4.10: Additional results; Voting behavior and party affiliation
Dependent variable: share of
anti-immigration votes SVP votes
OLS IV OLS IV
Icult.diff.jT 0.139
?? 1.114??? 0.165 0.910???
(0.066) (0.217) (0.105) (0.174)
βˆ·sd(Ic.diffjT )
sd(y) [0.053] [0.423] [0.058] [0.323]
Icult.sim.jT −0.119??? −0.201 −0.046 −0.164
(0.034) (0.136) (0.035) (0.114)
βˆ·sd(Ic.simjT )
sd(y) [−0.059] [−0.100] [−0.023] [−0.083]
F-stat. of excl. instr. (Ic.diffjT ) 47 103
F-stat. of excl. instr. (Ic.simjT ) 139 143
Mean 0.481 0.481 0.168 0.168
Standard deviation 0.152 0.152 0.153 0.153
Number of observations 57,960 57,960 12,601 12,601
Adjusted R-Squared 0.820 0.763 0.715 0.690
p-value (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demografic char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
NUTS2-specific vote FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the effects of the culture-specific immigrant share on anti-immigration
votes in the first two columns and on the share of SVP (Switzerland’s far-right party) voters in
the last two columns. ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. All models use the baseline covariate and fixed effects specifications. Robust standard
errors are given in parentheses and are clustered on municipality-level (2520 clusters).
The most striking aspect of the results is that the share of culturally different
immigrants is found to affect the two dependent variables very similarly, not only
qualitatively but also quantitatively. An increase in the local share of culturally dif-
ferent immigrants by one standard deviation leads to an increase in the proportion
of anti-immigration votes by 0.4 standard deviations and to an increase in the share
of right-wing voters by 0.3 standard deviations. There is obviously a tight link be-
tween voting and election behavior in connection with immigration, meaning that
individuals who are inclined to vote for the right-wing party also vote in line with the
party’s program, or vice versa. There is no evidence with respect to culturally similar
immigrants, however, that their presence causes people to vote for the far right.24
24These results are robust to all checks applied in table 4.8. The first stage and the reduced form
coefficients are statistically significant, and the F-value of the excluded instrument lies well above
the critical value.
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These results compare well with the results reported by Halla et al. (2012) for
Austria. For instance, they estimate that a one percentage point increase of the share
of immigrants with a medium education level leads to an 1.1 percentage point increase
in the share of FPO¨ voters (the right-wing party in Austria).
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter combines census data with outcomes of national votes about immigration
in Switzerland between 1970 and 2010 to analyze the causal relationship between the
local immigrant share and attitudes to immigration. The focus lies in understanding
how this relationship is affected by the level of dissimilarity in cultural values and
beliefs between Swiss citizens and immigrants. The sorting of Swiss immigrants into
different cultural groups is done based on findings from the World Value Surveys,
covering all relevant source countries of Swiss immigrants. To take the endogenous
settlement pattern of both, natives and foreigners into account, I instrument the
municipality immigrant share with that of the local labor market. The identifying
assumption is that the local labor market immigrant share is exogenousely determined
by family and friends or, put differently, that racially motivated mobility only exists
within but not between local labor markets. I provide evidence that strongly supports
the validity of this assumption.
The main finding of this chapter suggests that it is not the overall concentration
of immigrants per se, but merely the presence of immigrants with a different cultural
background that affects the voting behavior of Swiss citizens. More specifically, the
local share of culturally different immigrants turns out to be a significant and sizable
determinant of the percentage of anti-immigration votes. In contrast, the presence
of culturally similar immigrants does not seem to affect natives’ voting behavior at
all. A one percentage point increase in the share of culturally different immigrants
results in a 1.12 percentage point increase in anti-immigration votes in an average
national vote about immigration. A wide range of robustness checks suggests that
this result may be regarded as lower bound of the true effect. Moreover, checks show
that it also holds for each single vote and that it is not sensitive to a finer cultural
classification of immigrants. Additional analysis of participation rates suggests that
the effects are not driven by unobserved characteristics of individuals who opt to
participate in the voting process. The estimates in fact turn out to be independent of
voter turnout if we control for observed individual characteristics. This implies that
the main results of this study would still apply, even if voting had been mandatory.
Finally, exploiting election results for the right-wing party SVP reveals a further
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interesting finding. The share of culturally different immigrants appears to be an
equally important determinant of the percentage of right-wing voters as it is for the
percentage of anti-immigration votes, implying a tight link between Swiss citizens’
voting behavior in plebiscites and referendums in comparison to elections.
One possible explanation for the sizeable positive effect of culturally different immi-
grants on anti-immigration attitudes may relate to cultural concerns (non-economic
channel). More specifically, the native population may perceive culturally different
immigrants as threatening to the national culture, language, religion, or way of life in
general. However, since cultural values and beliefs are not the only difference between
the two groups of immigrants, I cannot rule out the possibility that labor market and
welfare concerns (economic channel) also explain part of the effect.
These findings may have implications for the continuing debates over immigra-
tion policy and help inform policy makers about possible impacts of the changing
immigrant composition on outcomes of future votes. The suggestion that the ethnic
composition of the locality in which individuals live might affect anti-immigrant atti-
tudes may also have implications for continuing debates about the nature and location
of new refugee accommodation centers.
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4.A Appendix
Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.1: National Votes on Immigration Topics
Nr. Year of Dec- Title of vote Re- Anti Turn- %Yes
v vote, t cade sult Imm. out(%) votes
220 1970 1970 PI “Against foreign infiltration” rej. yes 74.7 46.0
242 1974 1970 PI “Against foreign infiltration and rej. yes 70.3 34.2
overpopulation”
266 1977 1980 PI “For the limitation of naturalizations” rej. yes 45.2 33.8
310 1982 1980 Modifications in the aliens act rej. no 35.2 49.6
314 1983 1980 FR on modifications of civil right regu- acc. no 35.8 60.8
lations in the federal constitution
315 1983 1980 FR on easing certain naturalizations rej. no 35.9 44.8
320 1984 1980 PI “Against selling-off our homeland” rej. yes 42.5 48.9
344 1987 1990 Modifications in the asylum law acc. yes 42.4 67.3
345 1987 1990 FL on the stay and settlement of foreigners acc. yes 42.2 65.7
355 1988 1990 PI “For the limitation of immigration” rej. yes 52.8 32.7
411 1994 1990 FR on loosening naturalization regulations rej. no 46.8 52.8
for young foreigners
432 1996 2000 PI “Against illegal immigration” rej. yes 46.7% 46.3%
464 2000 2000 FR on the bilateral agreements between acc. no 48.3 67.2
Switzerland and the EU
467 2000 2000 PI “For an immigration regulation” rej. yes 45.3 36.2
491 2002 2000 PI “Against abuse of asylum right” rej. yes 47.9 49.9
511 2004 2000 FR on the acquisition of civil liberty for rej. no 53.8 48.4
foreigners of the 3rd generation
519 2005 2010 FR on the expansion of the FMA to the acc. no 54.4 56.0
new EU countries, and on the revision
of the underpinning measures
524 2006 2010 FR on foreigners acc. yes 49.0 68.0
525 2006 2010 Change in the asylum law acc. yes 49.1 67.8
532 2008 2010 PI “For democratic naturalizations” rej. yes 45.2 36.2
540 2009 2010 FR on the permission to continue with the acc. no 51.4 59.6
FMA’s and to additionally apply it to
Bulgaria and Romania
547 2009 2010 PI “Against the building of minarets” acc. yes 53.8 57.5
551 2010 2010 PI “Deportation initiative” acc. yes 52.9 52.9
Notes: This table lists all national votes on immigration topics between 1970 and 2010 whose
percentage share of affirmative votes was between 30% and 70%. Abbreviations mean the following:
FR: federal resolution, FL: federal law, PI: popular initiative; FMA: free mobility agreement.
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Table A.2: Main Results, detailed
OLS IV (2SLS)
MS-region-level instr.
Ijt 0.018 0.108
(0.027) (0.139)
Icult.diff.jt 0.140
?? 1.124???
(0.066) (0.217)
Icult.sim.jt −0.119??? −0.201
(0.034) (0.136)
Local area characteristics:
Proportion urban area 0.058??? 0.058??? 0.059??? 0.059???
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Border community −0.012?? −0.013?? −0.011 −0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Socio-demographic char’s:
Unemployed −2.261???−2.338??? −2.327??? −3.008???
(0.385) (0.382) (0.379) (0.721)
Not employed −0.457???−0.465??? −0.443??? −0.429???
(0.078) (0.077) (0.088) (0.114)
Not in working age 0.395??? 0.353??? 0.462??? 0.539???
(0.086) (0.085) (0.135) (0.147)
Self employed 0.041 0.048 0.052 0.130??
(0.035) (0.036) (0.033) (0.061)
Employed by family member −0.134???−0.176??? −0.114?? −0.245???
(0.046) (0.045) (0.054) (0.075)
Trainee 0.855??? 0.795??? 0.875??? 0.660??
(0.077) (0.077) (0.081) (0.320)
Mgmt. position −0.035 −0.039 −0.036 −0.065
(0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.076)
Secondary education −0.182???−0.189??? −0.180??? −0.209???
(0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.057)
Tertiary education −0.784???−0.787??? −0.752??? −0.636???
(0.043) (0.044) (0.065) (0.096)
Single −0.328???−0.352??? −0.327??? −0.438???
(0.068) (0.066) (0.071) (0.065)
Divorced, widowed 0.119 0.150 0.010 −0.305
(0.116) (0.111) (0.187) (0.325)
Age 0.051??? 0.047??? 0.055??? 0.055???
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
Age2 −0.001???−0.001??? −0.001??? −0.001???
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Women −0.277?? −0.220?? −0.282?? −0.016
(0.113) (0.110) (0.119) (0.162)
Catholic −0.044???−0.043??? −0.047??? −0.051???
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Jewish 1.921?? 1.844?? 2.140?? 2.697???
(0.827) (0.815) (1.050) (1.041)
Islamic 0.375 −0.265 0.153 −4.090???
(0.496) (0.528) (0.730) (1.018)
Other, no, unknown confession −0.195???−0.190??? −0.182??? −0.102
(0.039) (0.038) (0.042) (0.068)
Born abroad 0.229?? 0.359??? 0.097 0.185
(0.110) (0.110) (0.242) (0.251)
Notes: This table shows the detailed results of Table 4.7 for the baseline specification (M3).
See Table 4.7 for further information. The baseline categories of the dummy-variables are
defined as followed: employed, non mgmt.-position, mandatory education, married and
evangelic.
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Table A.3: First stage and reduced form coefficients
Panel A: Main results
First stage coefficients Reduced form coefficients
M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
(baseline) (baseline)
Ilt 1.001
??? 0.442??? 0.389??? −0.437???−0.069 0.042
(0.060) (0.036) (0.040) (0.054) (0.048) (0.053)
Icult.diff.lt 0.997
??? 0.805??? 0.733??? 0.591?? 1.026??? 0.896???
(0.068) (0.076) (0.081) (0.272) (0.094) (0.096)
Icult.sim.lt 1.035
??? 0.627??? 0.579??? −0.712???−0.463??? −0.323???
(0.039) (0.030) (0.035) (0.056) (0.047) (0.049)
Panel B: Robustness
First stage coefficients Reduced form coefficients
M4 M5 M6 M4 M5 M6
Icult.diff.lt 0.668
??? 0.514??? 0.639??? 0.982??? 1.300??? 0.345???
(0.058) (0.035) (0.153) (0.070) (0.053) (0.093)
Icult.sim.lt 0.566
??? 0.463??? 0.494??? −0.320???−0.324??? −0.115?
(0.034) (0.022) (0.048) (0.039) (0.029) (0.062)
M7 M8 M9 M7 M8 M9
x=j,1970 x=lt−1 x=mt x=j,1970 x=lt−1 x=mt
Icult.diff.x 0.822
??? 0.694??? 0.765??? 0.717??? 0.614??? 1.732???
(0.178) (0.110) (0.113) (0.187) (0.141) (0.124)
Icult.simx 0.435
??? 0.454??? 0.448??? −0.026 −0.180??? −0.239???
(0.023) (0.039) (0.039) (0.027) (0.043) (0.060)
Panel C: Sensitivity to cultural classification
First stage coefficients Reduced form coefficients
M10 M10
Icult.sim.lt 0.592
??? −0.324???
(0.034) (0.043)
Ic.diff.dim1lt 0.904
??? 0.875???
(0.064) (0.109)
Ic.diff.dim2lt 0.955
??? 0.926???
(0.336) (0.246)
Notes: This table shows the first stage and reduced form coefficients of the models
estimated in table 4.7, table 4.8 and table 4.9. See the notes of theses tables for further
information.
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Figure A.1: Global cultural map
Source: Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker; Modernization, Cultural Change, and the
Persistence of Traditional Values, American Sociological Review, 65(1), page 29.
Notes: This figures shows the locations of 65 societies on two dimensions of cross-cultural
variation: World Values Surveys, 1990-1991 and 1995-1998. The scales on each axis indicate
the country’s factor scores on the given dimension.
Figure A.2: Distribution of anti-immigration votes
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Notes: This figure shows for each vote the distribution of the dependent variable, the share
of anti-immigration votes at municipality-level, weighted by the corresponding population
size.
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